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Abstract This paper formalizes part of a well-known psychological model of emo-
tions. In particular, the logical structure underlying the conditions that trigger emotions
are studied and then hierarchically organized. The insights gained therefrom are used
to guide a formalization of emotion triggers, which proceeds in three stages. The
first stage captures the conditions that trigger emotions in a semiformal way, i.e.,
without committing to an underlying formalism and semantics. The second stage cap-
tures the main psychological notions used in the emotion model in dynamic doxastic
logic. The third stage introduces a BDI-based framework (belief–desire–intention)
with achievement goals, which is used to firmly ground the preceding stages. The
result is a formalization of emotion triggers for BDI agents with achievement goals.
The idea of proceeding in these stages is to provide different levels of commitment to
formalisms, so that it remains relatively easy to extend or replace the used formalisms
without having to start from scratch. Finally, we show that the formalization renders
properties of emotions that are in line with the psychological model on which it is
based.
Keywords Logic of emotions · Intelligent agents · Cognitive modeling
B. R. Steunebrink
IDSIA & University of Lugano, Galleria 2, 6928 Manno-Lugano, Switzerland
e-mail: bas@idsia.ch
M. Dastani · J.-J. Ch. Meyer (B)
Intelligent Systems Group, Institute of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University,





84 Synthese (2012) 185:83–129
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a lot of interest in bringing emotions to Artificial Intelligence,
in particular to model rational agents (Adam et al. 2009; Breazeal 2002; Dastani and
Meyer 2006; Gratch and Marsella 2004; Johns and Silverman 2001; Marinier and
Laird 2004; Meyer 2006; Picard 1997; Sloman 2001; Steunebrink 2010; Steunebrink
et al. 2007, 2008, 2009). There are (at least) three important reasons for this. First, an
obvious application of emotions is to make artificial agents and robots more believ-
able to human users. In particular, their behaviors are expected to appear increasingly
convincing, social, and intuitive if they seem to have an emotional state matching
that of a human in the same situation (Breazeal 2002; Gratch and Marsella 2004;
Marinier and Laird 2004; Picard 1997). Second, from a more theoretical perspective,
it is investigated what the role of emotions is in models of human decision-making
and how they may be employed to make these models more accurate and effective
(Coppin 2008; Elster 1996; Johns and Silverman 2001). Third, there exists psycho-
logical (Ekman and Davidson 1994; Frijda 1987; LeDoux 1996; Oatley and Jenkins
1996) and neurological (Damasio 1994) evidence that emotions are not only relevant
but even necessary for rational behavior. Particularly, it has been shown that persons
who do not experience emotions (e.g., due to specific brain damage) have trouble dis-
tinguishing between important and irrelevant details, consistently make bad decisions,
and do not display adequate social behavior necessary to function normally in society.
A related, more philosophical argument posits that emotions are an inevitable con-
sequence of mechanisms that allow for intelligent and rational behavior in complex
environments with limited resources (Elster 1996; Gordon 1987; Hoffman et al. 1991;
Sloman 2001).
There is little consensus among psychologists as to what exactly constitutes an emo-
tion and how it differs from related affective processes such as moods and impulses.
However, this does not mean that making broad classifications is impossible or use-
less. According to a classification by Gross and Thompson (2007), emotions typically
have specific objects and give rise to action tendencies relevant to these objects. More-
over, emotions can be both positive and negative. Emotions are often distinguished
from moods, which are more diffuse and last longer than emotions. Other affective
processes include stress, which arises in taxing circumstances and produces only neg-
ative responses; and impulses, which are related to hunger, sex, and pain and give rise
to responses with limited flexibility. Of these four types of affective processes, we will
focus on emotions in this paper.
With respect to emotions, usually three phases are distinguished. First, the perceived
situation is appraised by an individual based on what he or she thinks is relevant and
important. For example, Alice, who likes receiving presents, is given a necklace by
Bob. Alice then judges receiving the necklace as desirable and Bob’s action as praise-
worthy. Consequently, the appraisal of this action and its outcome causes gratitude
towards Bob to be triggered for Alice. Note that different types of emotions may be
triggered simultaneously by the same situation, some of which may even be seen as
conflicting. For example, Alice may at the same time be disappointed because it was
not the necklace she had hoped to receive. Emotion theories dealing with appraisal are
for example Frijda (1987), LeDoux (1996), Oatley and Jenkins (1996), Ortony et al.
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(1988), and Scherer et al. (2001). Second, the appraisal of some situation can cause
the triggered emotions, if exceeding some threshold, to create a conscious awareness
of emotional feelings, leading to the experience of having emotions. For example,
Alice’s gratitude towards Bob will have a certain intensity and will probably decrease
over a certain amount of time. All this may depend on, e.g., the degree of desirability
of receiving a necklace and Alice’s previous attitude towards Bob. Emotion theo-
ries dealing with these quantitative aspects of emotions are for example Ekman and
Davidson (1994), Frijda (1987), and Ortony et al. (1988). Third, emotional feelings
need to be regulated. For example, Alice may want to organize her behavior such
that positive emotions are triggered as often as possible and negative emotions are
avoided or drowned by positive ones. She could do this by being nice to Bob so that
he will give her more presents, or avoiding him altogether so that she will never again
be confronted with his bad taste in jewelry. In fact, some emotion theories posit that
the main purpose of emotions is to function as a heuristical mechanism for selecting
behaviors (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Oatley and Jenkins 1996). Emotion theo-
ries dealing with coping and behavioral consequences of emotions are for example
Ekman and Davidson (1994), Frijda (1987), Lazarus (1994), and Oatley and Jenkins
(1996).
With respect to models of rational agency, important topics include tracking of
goal achievements (i.e. rate of success), revision of plans, and where to focus atten-
tion. Emotion theories can provide solutions to these issues by treating emotions as
heuristics in the deliberation and decision making of agents. Given the aim to integrate
emotions in the models of artificial rational agents on the one hand, and the existence
of psychological theories of emotions on the other hand, a question that thus arises is
how we can adopt, formalize, and use psychological theories of emotions in models of
rational agency. Following psychological theories, at least three main issues (appraisal,
experience, regulation) need to be addressed in this effort, but of course this cannot
be done properly and comprehensively in one paper. The central question addressed
in this paper is how to model and integrate the appraisal part of emotions in agent
models. In particular, a formal framework must be built that is suitable for modeling
agents and for investigating how appraisal can be integrated in this formal framework.
In order to do this, we must map psychological concepts onto agent concepts so that
they can be appropriately formalized.
In this paper, we will present a formalization of the eliciting conditions of emotions
as described in the psychological model of Ortony et al. (1988).1 We have chosen
the OCC model because it provides a clear classification of a broad range of emotion
types, it lists concise descriptions of the conditions that elicit emotions, and for this
it uses concepts that are well studied and relatively straightforward to formalize. The
presented formalization constitutes a formal model for the appraisal part of the OCC
emotion theory. This formal model is an extension of an agent specification framework
(i.e., KARO, Meyer et al. 1999; Meyer 2006) that specifies agents in terms of cogni-
tive concepts that are also used in the OCC model. For each emotion type from the
OCC model we translate the eliciting conditions, which define the appraisal process
1 Henceforth to be referred to as “the OCC model” or simply “OCC.”
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corresponding to that emotion type, into concepts from the formal agent framework.
The contribution of this paper is to provide a formal agent model in which the appraisal
part of the complete set of emotion types from the OCC model is integrated. We show
that the formalization is adequate by providing a logical analysis and proving intuitive
properties of the model.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we give an overview of the psycho-
logical OCC model of emotions. We will particularly study its logical structure in
great detail, because it is on this structure that our formalization will be based. The
formalization will proceed in three stages, spread over Sects. 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
The first stage will be a semiformal specification of the logical structure of eliciting
conditions. The second stage will capture the main notions used in the OCC model
in dynamic doxastic logic. The third stage will formalize the main appraisal notions
used in the OCC model in the KARO framework, which is an extension of dynamic
doxastic logic, and thus firmly grounds the preceding stages. In Sect. 6 we will discuss
and compare related work, and Sect. 7 will conclude this paper.
2 The OCC model
In their book “The Cognitive Structure of Emotions”, Ortony et al. (1988) have pro-
posed a very interesting model of emotions that provides specifications of the eliciting
conditions of emotions and the variables that affect their intensities. This psycholog-
ical model of emotions is popular among computer scientists that are trying to build
systems that reason about emotions or incorporate emotions in artificial characters.
This popularity is due to the model’s clear and convincing structure.
2.1 Overview of the OCC model
The OCC model classifies 22 types of emotions. This is done by considering on which
kinds of aspects of a situation one can focus his or her attention. OCC consider a
human can either focus on consequences of events,2 actions of agents, or aspects of
objects. If one focuses on a consequence of an event, one can appraise this conse-
quence as desirable or undesirable (or both, or neither) with respect to one’s goals.
For example, joy about winning a lottery is an event-based emotion, because the
satisfaction of the goal to become rich is a desirable consequence of the event of
winning the lottery. If one focuses on an action of an agent, one can appraise this
action as praiseworthy or blameworthy (or both, or neither) with respect to one’s
standards. For example, pride about saving a child from drowning is an action-based
emotion, because it is praiseworthy to perform an action which satisfies the standard
that one should save a person’s life whenever (reasonably) possible. If one focuses on
an aspect of an object, one can appraise this aspect as appealing or unappealing (or
both, or neither) with respect to one’s attitudes. For example, love for an old car is an
2 On p. 18 (Ortony et al. 1988), OCC say that “events are simply people’s construals about things that
happen.” From a computational perspective, however, we would say that this is far from simple!
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object-based emotion, because the car may have appealing aspects according to one’s
attitudes.
Within these three main categories of emotion types, the OCC model makes fur-
ther differentiations based on, e.g., whether prospects are relevant (as in hope and
fear), whether events apply to others (as in pity and gloating), or whether an action
was performed by the self or someone else (to distinguish e.g. pride from admira-
tion). Additionally, some event-based and action-based emotion types are combined
to form a group of emotions concerning consequences of events caused by actions
of agents. For example, anger can arise when one focuses on both the blameworthy
action of another agent and an undesirable event which has been (presumed to be)
caused by it. It should be emphasized that in the OCC model, emotions are never
used to describe the entire cognitive state of an agent (as in “Alice is happy”); rather,
emotions are always relative to individual events, actions, and objects. So Alice can
be joyous about receiving her new furniture and at the same time be distressed about
the height of the accompanying bill.
2.2 The logical structure of the OCC model
Although many ad hoc or simplified implementations of the OCC model have been
made, there have been fewer attempts at formalizing the complete, logical struc-
ture of the proposed emotion model (e.g., Adam et al. 2009; Gratch and Marsella
2004; Steunebrink 2010; Steunebrink et al. 2007). Here we will attempt to do so,
using a formal logic containing constructs to reason about agents, their beliefs and
actions, objects, and consequences of actions/events. We will be formalizing the elic-
iting conditions of emotions in this logic, trying to stay as close as possible to the OCC
model.
On p. 19 of their book (Ortony et al. 1988), OCC present a diagram which structures
their emotion types based on focus of attention. This diagram is often reproduced when
an overview of the OCC model is to be given. In this section we give an overview
of the OCC model, but we will illustrate the OCC model with a slightly different
diagram (see Fig. 1). The purpose of this paper is to provide a logical account of
emotion triggers. However, OCC’s diagram as it appeared in Ortony et al. (1988),
which is based on focus of attention, is not very well suited to guide our formaliza-
tion, because it is not compositional (see Steunebrink 2010 for a detailed discussion
on this issue). Therefore, we have created the new diagram illustrating the structure
of the emotion types based on their eliciting conditions. It should be noted that in
personal communication, Ortony and Clore have confirmed Fig. 1 to be an accurate
compositional illustration of the logical structure underlying the eliciting conditions
of their emotion types (Ortony and Clore 2009). The following paragraphs serve to
explain Fig. 1, which, importantly, serves as a guide for the formalization that will be
presented in the next sections.
Figure 1 can be seen as an inheritance structure. This means that the depicted
emotion types are specializations of those above them and generalizations of those
below them. This inheritance-based perspective results in a compositional formula-
tion of the eliciting conditions. At the most general level, all emotions are valenced
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Fig. 1 An inheritance-based view of the eliciting conditions of emotions of the OCC model. Reading the
labels on the lines from the top to any node provides a description of the emotion type represented by that
node. Note though that these labels serve only for ease of reading; technical description are provided later
on (see Table 1). The interested reader can find a more detailed analysis of the differences between OCC’s
diagrams and descriptions and ours in Steunebrink (2010)
reactions (to something). Although valenced reactions can have different magnitudes,
each one is at least either positive or negative. Therefore ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ have
been placed at the top of the hierarchy. At the next level, the OCC model specifies
that valenced reactions can be directed at either consequences of events,3 actions of
3 Although the phrase “(un)desirable event” is used many times by OCC, events are actually always
appraised with respect to their consequences. For example, an earthquake in itself does not have a valence;
only the consequences of this event (e.g., valuable lessons for seismologists, property damage, loss of life)
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agents, or aspects of objects. ‘Pleased’ and ‘displeased’ have been chosen by OCC
to function as labels for the most general type of valenced reactions to consequences
of events, because they are very neutral sounding words with respect to intensity of
experience, focus of attention, motivational and behavioral effects, etc. For the same
reasons, ‘approving’ and ‘disapproving’ are used as labels for the most general type of
valenced reactions to actions of agents, and ‘liking’ and ‘disliking’ are used as labels
for the most general type of valenced reactions to aspects of objects.
With respect to valenced reactions to consequences of events, a distinction is made
based on whether the consequence in question is prospective4 or not. For exam-
ple, learning that tomorrow it will rain is an event, but it has an undesirable con-
sequence (e.g., the undermining of the goal to have a dry picnic) that is prospective
and not actual. But this event can also have a consequence which is actual (e.g.,
the achievement of the goal to know the weather forecast). This differentiation on
prospects then results in distinguishing between the ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ types on the
one hand (e.g., Alice fears tomorrow her picnic will get wet) and the ‘joy’ and ‘dis-
tress’ types on the other hand (e.g., Alice is joyous about having learned the weather
forecast).
With respect to valenced reactions to actions of agents, a distinction is made on
whether the action in question has been performed by the self or by someone else. The
distinction between “one’s own action” and “someone else’s action” is, however, not
as simple as it may seem. A mother may be proud of the achievements of her son, even
though the actions of her son are, strictly speaking, not her own. To resolve this, the
OCC model uses the concept of a cognitive unit: the mother can consider herself and
her son as part of a single cognitive unit and then, when appraising her son’s actions
as praiseworthy, feel proud of the actions performed by (an agent in) the cognitive
unit. This differentiation on cognitive unit then results in distinguishing between the
‘pride’ and ‘shame’ types on the one hand, and the ‘admiration’ and ‘reproach’ types
on the other hand.
At this point the reader may expect there to be a branch below liking and disliking,
after seeing branches being added below pleased/displeased and approving/disapprov-
ing. Indeed, in the original diagram of the OCC model (Ortony et al. 1988, p. 19), a
single branch appears below liking/disliking with the emotion types ‘love’ and ‘hate’.
The idea of OCC was that ‘love’ and ‘hate’ are examples of emotions of the type
‘liking’ and ‘disliking’, respectively (Ortony and Clore 2009). However, this means
that the distinction between love/hate and liking/disliking does not constitute a dif-
ferentiation in terms of eliciting conditions, but merely that ‘love’ is a token for the
Footnote 3 continued
are appraised as being desirable or undesirable. Because desirability only applies to consequences of events,
every instance of the phrase “(un)desirable event” should actually be read as a shorthand for “(un)desirable
consequence of an event” (Ortony and Clore 2009).
4 The term “prospect” (used in, e.g., hope and fear) is intentionally ambiguous: it is used to refer to both
future events and uncertain (past or current) events. For example, hoping that tomorrow will be a sunny
day is future-directed, whereas hoping that a mailed package has safely reached its intended recipient is
uncertainty-directed. Many formalizations appear to use OCC’s notion of prospect in only one of these
senses. For example, Adam et al. (2009) and Gratch and Marsella (2004) only used uncertain prospects
when formalizing hope and fear, whereas Steunebrink et al. (2007) only used future prospects.
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type of emotions labeled ‘liking’ and that ‘hate’ is a token for the type of emotions
labeled ‘disliking’. So in our inheritance-based perspective, no branch has to be added
below liking/disliking, because ‘love’ and ‘hate’ are not specializations of ‘liking’ and
‘disliking’ with respect to eliciting conditions.
In addition to valenced reaction to either consequences of events or actions of
agents, the OCC model also considers several types of emotions arising from observ-
ing relations between the two. Specifically, these emotion types correspond to valenced
reactions to consequences of events caused by actions of agents. The eliciting condi-
tions of these so-called compound emotion types are conjunctions of their constituent
emotion types: ‘joy’ plus ‘pride’ is ‘gratification’, ‘joy’ plus ‘admiration’ is ‘grati-
tude’, ‘distress’ plus ‘shame’ is ‘remorse’, and ‘distress’ plus ‘reproach’ is ‘anger’.
Note, however, that this “plus” contains an implicit assertion about their (presumably
causal) relation. For example, ‘anger’ is specified as “(disapproving of) someone else’s
blameworthy action and (being displeased about) the related undesirable event”.
At the bottom of the hierarchy (of Fig. 1) are several emotions that are special types
of ‘joy’ and ‘distress’. Consider first ‘satisfaction’, ‘fears-confirmed’, ‘relief’, and
‘disappointment’. Together with ‘hope’ and ‘fear’, these six emotion types are called
prospect-based in the OCC model. However, the eliciting conditions of the former
four emotion types are not extensions of ‘hope’ and ‘fear’, but of ‘joy’ and ‘distress’.
Specifically, ‘satisfaction’, ‘fears-confirmed’, ‘relief’, and ‘disappointment’ are emo-
tions in response to actual consequences of events, namely consequences signaling
the confirmation or disconfirmation of a previously prospective consequence. The
relation between, e.g., hope and disappointment is thus more of a temporal kind. For
example, first Bob hopes Alice will show up for their date, but when she does not,
his hope turns into disappointment. Thus ‘satisfaction’, ‘fears-confirmed’, ‘relief’,
and ‘disappointment’ are not special kinds of ‘hope’ or ‘fear’, but more like contin-
uations of ‘hope’ or ‘fear’, counting from the point when an event has been per-
ceived that signals the confirmation or disconfirmation of the thing hoped for or
feared.5
Next consider ‘happy-for’, ‘resentment’, ‘gloating’, and ‘pity’, called the fortunes-
of-others emotion types. These are valenced reactions arising from presuming that
events have consequences for others. However, for there to be, e.g., a ‘happy-for’
emotion, the consequence that is desirable for the other must also be desirable for
oneself to some degree (probably because it satisfies an interest goal to wish other
people well, as suggested on p. 94; Ortony et al. 1988). But if a consequence of an
event is appraised as being desirable for oneself, the conditions for ‘joy’ are satisfied.
So logically speaking, the eliciting conditions of ‘happy-for’ and ‘gloating’ entail
those of ‘joy’, and the eliciting conditions of ‘resentment’ and ‘pity’ entail those of
‘distress’. Therefore, in an inheritance-based hierarchy of eliciting conditions, the
5 The dashes accompanying ‘satisfaction’, ‘fears-confirmed’, ‘relief’, and ‘disappointment’ in Fig. 1 are
intentional and do not indicate a problem. For example, ‘satisfaction’ is a label for a positively valenced
reaction to the confirmation of a prospective desirable consequence, but the dashes below ‘satisfaction’ are
a placeholder for a negatively valenced reaction to the confirmation of a prospective desirable consequence.
Of course, in practice such a negative reaction to something positive never occurs, and thus does not have
to be labeled.
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Table 1 These emotion type specifications correspond directly to Fig. 1
positive and negative are valenced reactions (to “something”)
pleased is being positive about a consequence (of an event)
displeased is being negative about a consequence (of an event)
hope is being pleased about a prospective consequence (of an event)
fear is being displeased about a prospective consequence (of an event)
joy is being pleased about an actual consequence (of an event)
distress is being displeased about an actual consequence (of an event)
satisfaction is joy about the confirmation of a prospective desirable consequence
fears-confirmed is distress about the confirmation of a prospective undesirable consequence
relief is joy about the disconfirmation of a prospective undesirable consequence
disappointment is distress about the disconfirmation of a prospective desirable consequence
happy-for is joy about a consequence (of an event)presumed to be desirable for someone else
resentment is distress about a consequence (of an event) presumed to be desirable for someone else
gloating is joy about a consequence (of an event) presumed to be undesirable for someone else
pity is distress about a consequence (of an event) presumed to be undesirable for someone else
approving is being positive about an action (of an agent)
disapproving is being negative about an action (of an agent)
pride is approving of one’s own action
shame is disapproving of one’s own action
admiration is approving of someone else’s action
reproach is disapproving of someone else’s action
gratification is pride about an action and joy about a related consequence
remorse is shame about an action and distress about a related consequence
gratitude is admiration about an action and joy about a related consequence
anger is reproach about an action and distress about a related consequence
liking is being positive about an aspect (of an object)
disliking is being negative about an aspect (of an object)
fortunes-of-others emotion types must be placed below ‘joy’ and ‘distress’, because
the latter two emotion types are generalizations of them. Note that “mixed feelings”
are allowed here; for example, consider the good friends Alice and Bob vying for
the same position, with Alice being awarded the job. Then Bob may be distressed
about having lost out but at the same time be happy for his friend Alice. There is no
contradiction here; the OCC model, and our formalization of it, allows for seemingly
opposite emotions to be triggered simultaneously. But note that even this by no means
implies that both will be experienced simultaneously or with equal intensity; we are
just modeling emotion elicitation or triggering here (though see Steunebrink 2010 for
an additional quantitative model of emotional experience).
The specifications of eliciting conditions resulting from reading Fig. 1 are summed
up in Table 1. It is crucial to take note of Table 1 because it will serve as our guide in
the formalization of emotion triggers.
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3 Capturing the logical structure of the OCC model
In this section, we will make a start with the formalization of the eliciting conditions
of emotions according to the OCC model. It is important to note that a distinction
is made between what triggers an emotion and how an emotion is experienced. The
intensity at which an emotion is felt is influenced by many factors. Emotional expe-
rience is probably multidimensional, but it is also assumed that an estimate can be
made of the “overall felt intensity” of any emotion (Frijda et al. 1992). For example,
a questionnaire about emotional feelings may include a question like “indicate how
angry you were when hearing about the political murder on a scale from 1 to 10” and
such questions are usually not difficult to answer.
In the rest of this paper, it is assumed the following relation between emotion
triggering and emotion experience exists:
emotion_type is experienced if and only if
(1) emotion_type has been triggered sometime in the past and
(2) overall felt intensity of emotion_type is positive
With “positive” we mean having a value strictly greater than zero. Emotional intensity
does not take on negative values. An emotion type for which the triggering conditions
hold is not necessarily experienced, because its intensity may be too low (i.e., zero).
And an emotion type which is being experienced does not have to have its triggering
conditions to hold, because it may have been triggered some time in the past. In this
section and the next two, we will focus on the triggering conditions of the emotion
types of the OCC model. The treatment of emotional experience, as expressed in terms
of triggering and intensity as above, can be found in Steunebrink (2010).
Note that in this section, all formulas are only semiformal, since no semantics are
yet given, only intuitive readings. We use logical connectives with their usual inter-
pretation and some operators with suggestive names. The idea is that the presented
formulas are formal enough to adequately capture the logical structure of the psycho-
logical model, while remaining free from a commitment to an underlying formalism.
In later sections we will commit to one formalism and provide a firm grounding, but
it is our intention that it remains possible to plug in another formalism if desired. This
way one can provide a different interpretation of the operators, without having to start
from scratch regarding the overall logical structure of the model.
The structure of our formalization of emotion triggers was illustrated in Fig. 1; we
will be following this figure (from top to bottom) and its textual version Table 1 in the
next subsections.
3.1 General emotion types
At the most abstract level, the OCC model considers an emotion as a valenced reac-
tion, which can either be positive or negative. So ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are regarded
by OCC as the most general, undifferentiated emotion types. In order to know which
one of ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ (or both, or neither) is triggered at some point, some-
thing must be perceived and valued, which is called appraisal. We should note that
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the term ‘appraisal’ can be used to mean perception as well as valuation. In order to
avoid confusion, we explicitly mention perception (of an event, action, or object) as a
precondition for appraisal, and use the term appraisal strictly for valuation.
We can thus (trivially) specify the triggering conditions of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’
as the perception of something good and bad, respectively:
PositiveTi (X)
def= Perceivei (X) ∧ Goodi (X) (3.1)
NegativeTi (X)
def= Perceivei (X) ∧ Badi (X) (3.2)
Emotions are always relative to something, and here X stands for that “something.”
PositiveTi (X) is read as “a positively valenced reaction to X is triggered for agent i .”
The superscript “T” (for trigger) indicates that we are talking about eliciting con-
ditions, in order to avoid confusion with actual experience. It is crucial to note that
PositiveTi (X) is not the same as “agent i is positive about X .” The feeling of being
positive about X may manifest itself gradually over time, if at all, and may not coincide
with the satisfaction of its triggering conditions, which is what PositiveTi (X) expresses.
Perceivei (X) is read as “agent i perceives X .” Goodi (X) is read as “agent i
appraises X as good,” and similarly for Badi (X).
With ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ at the top of the hierarchy, the first differentiation is
with respect to the object of the emotion. As previously described, the OCC model
considers three types: consequences of events, actions of agents, and aspects of objects.
We can thus define ‘perceive’ as a disjunction of perceiving either of these three:
Perceivei (X)
def= PerceiveConseqi (X) ∨ (3.3)
PerceiveActioni (X) ∨
PerceiveObjecti (X)
These three perception constructs will be clarified in the next three subsections, respec-
tively.
If a consequence of an event is appraised as being good or bad, it is said to be ‘desir-
able’ or ‘undesirable’, respectively. If an action of an agent is appraised as being good
or bad, it is said to be ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘blameworthy’, respectively. If an aspect of an
object is appraised as being good or bad, it is said to be ‘appealing’ or ‘unappealing’,
respectively. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ can thus be defined in terms of these six notions as
follows:
Goodi (X)
def= Desi (X) ∨ Praisewi (X) ∨ Appeali (X) (3.4)
Badi (X)
def= Undesi (X) ∨ Blamewi (X) ∨ Unappeali (X) (3.5)
A note about the types of arguments is in order here. As noted previously, desir-
ability is only applicable to consequences of events, praiseworthiness is only appli-
cable to actions of agents, etc. However, the current construction says that, e.g.,
PerceiveConseqi (X) ∧ Praisewi (X) → PositiveTi (X) is valid. Of course, in this
example, either PerceiveConseqi (X) or Praisewi (X) must be applied to the wrong
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type of X . Therefore it is assumed that all these constructs6 evaluate to false if they
are applied to an argument of the wrong type. This way PerceiveConseqi (X) ∧
Praisewi (X) is always false and the implication is still true.
It should also be noted that none of the desirable–undesirable, praiseworthy–blame-
worthy, and appealing–unappealing pairs are considered to be opposites, nor are they
considered to be mutually exclusive. For example, a consequence which is not desirable
is not necessarily undesirable; a lack of appeal does not make something unappealing;
and the exact same action can be appraised as being both praiseworthy and blamewor-
thy. Therefore, we really need six distinct appraisal constructs here. These three pairs
of appraisal operators will be clarified in the next three subsections, respectively.
3.1.1 General event-based emotion types
Here we consider the emotion types concerning consequences of events. At the top of
this branch are placed the labels ‘pleased’ and ‘displeased’ (see Fig. 1). OCC consider
desirability as the central variable measuring how positive an event is for an indi-
vidual. An event that is valued negatively is called undesirable. As noted previously,
undesirability is not the same as the absence of desirability, nor are desirability and
undesirability assumed to exclude each other; they are seen as separate variables.7 In
the following, we will treat desirability in a qualitative manner, i.e., something is either
desirable or not. Of course, there can be degrees of desirability, so when we say that
something is desirable, this may be read as “having strictly positive desirability,” and
when we say “not desirable,” this may be read as “having zero desirability.” Analogous
readings apply to undesirability.
Below is then a (semiformal) logical description of the eliciting conditions of
‘pleased’ and ‘displeased’. PleasedTi (c) should be read as “pleased about consequence
c of an event is triggered for agent i ,” and similarly for ‘displeased’.
PleasedTi (c)
def= PerceiveConseqi (c) ∧ Desi (c) (3.6)
DispleasedTi (c)
def= PerceiveConseqi (c) ∧ Undesi (c) (3.7)
These formulas express that the eliciting conditions of being ‘pleased’ and being ‘dis-
pleased’ have two components; namely, the perception of a consequence of an event
and the appraisal of that consequence as being (un)desirable. PerceiveConseqi (c) is
read as “agent i perceives consequence c (of an event)” and Desi (c) is read as “agent i
appraises consequence c as desirable (with respect to its goals),” or, less precisely, “i
desires c.” It will be clear that ‘pleased’ and ‘displeased’ are undifferentiated event-
based emotions, because nothing is assumed about what kind of consequence we are
6 That is, PerceiveConseq, PerceiveAction, PerceiveObject, Des, Undes, Praisew, Blamew, Appeal,
and Unappeal.
7 OCC use undesirability as a kind of negative desirability, i.e., a consequence is undesirable if its desir-
ability is strictly less than zero. Here we prefer to keep desirability and undesirability as separate measures,
each ranging over non-negative values. But it will be clear that the two approaches do not conflict.
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dealing with, nor anything about who or what caused the event, nor to whom (other
than the appraising agent) the consequence applies.
3.1.2 General action-based emotion types
At the top of the branch of emotion types concerning actions of agents are placed the
labels ‘approving’ and ‘disapproving’, which are regarded by OCC as the most general
action-based emotion types. The OCC model considers praiseworthiness and blame-
worthiness to be the central variables for valuating actions of agents. Analogously to
‘pleased’ and ‘displeased’ (see above), ‘approving’ and ‘disapproving’ can be speci-
fied as perceiving an action of an agent and appraising that action as praiseworthy or
blameworthy (or both, if one has conflicting standards). ApprovingTi ( j :a) should be
read as “approving of action a by agent j is triggered for agent i ,” and similarly for
‘disapproving’.
ApprovingTi ( j :a) def= PerceiveActioni ( j :a) ∧ Praisewi ( j :a) (3.8)
DisapprovingTi ( j :a) def= PerceiveActioni ( j :a) ∧ Blamewi ( j :a) (3.9)
PerceiveActioni ( j :a) is read as “agent i perceives agent j has performed action a.”
Praisewi ( j :a) is read as “agent i appraises action a by agent j as praiseworthy (with
respect to its standards),” and similarly for Blamewi ( j :a) and ‘blameworthy’.
3.1.3 General object-based emotion types
At the top of the branch of emotion types concerning aspects of objects are placed the
labels ‘liking’ and ‘disliking’, which are regarded by OCC as the most general object-
based emotion types. The OCC model considers appealingness and unappealingness
to be the central variables for valuating aspects of objects. Just as desirability only
applies to consequences of events, the OCC model considers appealingness to apply
to aspects of objects. In the rest of this paper, however, we will simplify slightly by
not representing aspects explicitly. This is usually not problematic, because different
aspects of an object can often be regarded as objects themselves. For example, differ-
ent aspects of a car, (e.g., headlights, doors, wheels) are objects themselves that can
be liked or disliked. The appraisal of aspects that are not objects (e.g., the car’s color)
is simply assumed to be handled implicitly by the constructs for appealingness and
unappealingness when applied to the object in question.
Analogously to the event-based and action-based emotion types above, ‘liking’
and ‘disliking’ can be specified as perceiving an object and appraising that object as
appealing or unappealing. LikingTi (x) should be read as “liking of object x is triggered
for agent i ,” and similarly for ‘disliking’.
LikingTi (x)
def= PerceiveObjecti (x) ∧ Appeali (x) (3.10)
DislikingTi (x)
def= PerceiveObjecti (x) ∧ Unappeali (x) (3.11)
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PerceiveObjecti (x) is read as “agent i perceives object x .” Appeali (x) is read as
“agent i appraises object x as appealing (with respect to its attitudes),” and similarly
for Unappeali (x) and ‘unappealing’.
3.2 Concrete emotion types
In this section we will provide semiformal descriptions of the eliciting conditions of
the third layer (of Fig. 1) of emotion types.
3.2.1 Event-based emotion types
The first differentiation with respect to event-based emotion types is on whether the
consequence in question is prospective or actual. First, we will treat the case of pro-
spective consequences of events, leading to the emotion types labeled as ‘hope’ and
‘fear’.
HopeTi (c)
def= PleasedTi (c) ∧ Prospectivei (c) (3.12)
FearTi (c)
def= DispleasedTi (c) ∧ Prospectivei (c) (3.13)
Prospectivei (c) is read as “agent i considers c to be a prospective consequence (of an
event).” HopeTi (c) is then read as “hope about consequence c (of an event) is triggered
for agent i ,” and similarly for ‘fear’.
Next, we will treat the case of actual consequences, leading to the emotion types
labeled as ‘joy’ and ‘distress’.
JoyTi (c)
def= PleasedTi (c) ∧ Actuali (c) (3.14)
DistressTi (c)
def= DispleasedTi (c) ∧ Actuali (c) (3.15)
Actuali (c) is read as “agent i considers c to be an actual consequence (of an event).”
JoyTi (c) is then read as “joy about consequence c (of an event) is triggered for agent i ,”
and similarly for ‘distress’. With the danger of getting ahead of ourselves, we remark
that our grounding of the Prospective and Actual will make them mutually exclusive
(see Sect. 3.5).
We emphasize again that ‘joy’ and ‘distress’ are considered as nothing more than
convenient labels for these emotion types. Other labels are perfectly possible as well;
for example, emotions of the type labeled as ‘joy’ include contentment, delight, being
glad, happiness, cheerfulness, being ecstatic, and so on and so forth. Similarly, emo-
tions of the type labeled as ‘distress’ include sadness, upset, being distraught, shock,
etc. If one further differentiates the type of event towards which one is distressed, even
more specific labels can be chosen. For example, being distressed about the loss of a
loved one can be labeled as ‘grief’ and being distressed about the loss of an opportunity
can be labeled as ‘regret’. The OCC model does not pursue further differentiation of
‘joy’ and ‘distress’ besides the emotion types shown at the bottom of Fig. 1, but this
is certainly an interesting direction for future research.
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3.2.2 Attribution emotion types
The OCC model considers one differentiation in the action-based emotion types,
namely in the actor. By differentiating with respect to the concept of cognitive unit
(see Sect. 2.2), the action-based emotion types can be captured as follows:
PrideTi ( j :a) def= ApprovingTi ( j :a) ∧ CogUniti ( j) (3.16)
ShameTi ( j :a) def= DisapprovingTi ( j :a) ∧ CogUniti ( j) (3.17)
AdmirationTi ( j :a) def= ApprovingTi ( j :a) ∧ ¬CogUniti ( j) (3.18)
ReproachTi ( j :a) def= DisapprovingTi ( j :a) ∧ ¬CogUniti ( j) (3.19)
CogUniti ( j) is read as “agent i views agent j as being in a cognitive unit with itself.”
PrideTi ( j :a) is then read as “pride about action a of agent j is triggered for agent i ,”
and similarly for ‘shame’, ‘admiration’, and ‘reproach’.
A note on the usage of CogUniti ( j) versus ¬CogUniti ( j) is in order here. Con-
sider Bob watching his country’s skier win a championship; now Bob may consider
his country’s skier as being in his cognitive unit and feel pride, but he may also con-
sider his country’s skier as being outside his cognitive unit and admire the skier for
winning. At first sight this simultaneous occurrence of pride and admiration may seem
to be excluded here, but this is in fact not the case. What our model says is that they
cannot be triggered at the same moment, but they can still be triggered in succession
and then be experienced simultaneously (experience is something that persists through
time; triggering is a property of one instance in time). Because the set of agents con-
tained in one’s cognitive unit is allowed to vary over time, Bob can indeed view his
country’s skier as being in a cognitive unit with himself and not so, but just not at
the exact same moment in time. CogUniti ( j) is like a perspective of agent i on agent
j , and, in line with OCC (Ortony 2009), we maintain that an agent cannot hold two
different perspectives on another agent at the same time. In order to change its per-
spective, an agent must perform a (mental) action, which consumes (a small amount
of) time. Since emotional experience can endure over time, a pride and an admiration
emotion for one and the same action can be experienced simultaneously even though
they may have been triggered at different times in the past. So mixed emotions are
by no means excluded by requiring CogUniti ( j) to be either true or false. The fact
that Des, Praisew, and Appeal have negative counterparts (i.e., Undes, Blamew, and
Unappeal) is due to the fact that they are valenced predicates, which CogUnit is not.
For example, for desirability we can have positive (Des), negative (Undes), mixed
feelings (Des and Undes), or indifferent (Des nor Undes); for CogUnit we have just
yes or no, meaning that it suffices to have CogUnit and its logical negation.
At this point the reader may expect to find additional terms in the specifications
of the action-based emotions, to deal with aspects such as effort and responsibility.
Therefore we emphasize again that we have made a very consistent separation between
what we treat qualitatively, and what quantitatively. In our approach, we treat qualita-
tively all concepts that are used by OCC to define the eliciting conditions of emotions,
because these conditions state whether in a certain situation and point in time emotions
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are triggered, yes or no. All concepts that do not appear in the eliciting conditions, but
that do affect the experience of emotions, are treated quantitatively (so that we will
be able to quantify emotional intensity).8 In the current paper, we only formalize the
eliciting conditions of emotions, according to the OCC model. Since concepts such
as effort and responsibility do not appear in the eliciting conditions as described by
OCC, they also do not appear in our formalization thereof. (OCC do identify effort and
responsibility, but only as a component of the quantitative strength of praiseworthiness
and blameworthiness and not as a separate factor.)
3.2.3 Attraction emotion types
The OCC model does not structure the valenced reactions to aspects of objects, even
though OCC admit that momentary reactions of liking and disliking are among the most
salient experiences for humans. Interestingly, they do consider one variable affecting
the intensity of liking and disliking reactions (besides appealingness), namely famil-
iarity, but they have chosen not to differentiate based on this variable. Differentiating
based on familiarity would not be correct because the relation between familiarity and
overall liking or disliking is not monotonic (Ortony et al. 1988; Ortony 2009; Ortony
and Clore 2009). As is also suggested by the proverb “familiarity breeds contempt,”
liking of an object can decrease when one is very familiar with it, even though initially,
liking usually increases with familiarity. Indeed, in the OCC model it is suggested that
the relation between familiarity and overall liking probably follows a bell shape.
3.3 Compounds
Two branches of Fig. 1 combine to form the so-called compound emotion types. These
emotions arise when one focuses on both the praiseworthiness of an action and the
desirability of the related consequences. According to OCC, the eliciting conditions of
the compound emotion types are a conjunction of the eliciting conditions of an event-
based emotion (‘joy’ or ‘distress’) and an action-based emotion (‘pride’, ‘shame’,
‘admiration’, or ‘reproach’), together with an assertion about their relatedness. How-
ever, realizing that an action and a consequence of an event are related may come at a
later time than perceiving either the action or the consequence. Therefore, we need to
be able to look back in time when describing the eliciting conditions of the compound
emotion types. To this end, we use the construct Past ϕ, which asserts that ϕ was true
sometime in the past, where, importantly, the past is understood to include the present.
The compound emotion types can then be captured as follows:
GratificationTi ( j :a, c) def= Past PrideTi ( j :a) ∧ Past JoyTi (c)
∧ PerceiveRelatedi ( j :a, c) (3.20)
8 The interested reader can find an additional quantitative model on top of the presented qualitative model
in Steunebrink (2010).
123 [428]
Synthese (2012) 185:83–129 99
RemorseTi ( j :a, c) def= Past ShameTi ( j :a) ∧ Past DistressTi (c)
∧ PerceiveRelatedi ( j :a, c) (3.21)
GratitudeTi ( j :a, c) def= Past AdmirationTi ( j :a) ∧ Past JoyTi (c)
∧ PerceiveRelatedi ( j :a, c) (3.22)
AngerTi ( j :a, c) def= Past ReproachTi ( j :a) ∧ Past DistressTi (c)
∧ PerceiveRelatedi ( j :a, c) (3.23)
PerceiveRelatedi ( j : a, c) is read as “agent i perceives action a of agent j as being
related to consequence c.” GratificationTi ( j :a, c) is then read as “gratification about
action a of agent j and the related consequence c is triggered for agent i ,” and similarly
for ‘remorse’, ‘gratitude’, and ‘anger’.
In order to ensure that the action appearing twice in each of these definitions is
really the same action, it is assumed that all actions are unique. This can be seen as
each performed action being a unique instance of an action. For example, j : a in
GratificationTi ( j :a, c) appears in both PrideTi ( j :a) and PerceiveRelatedi ( j :a, c).
With this assumption of uniqueness, the action that is the object of the perceived rela-
tion (i.e., j :a in PerceiveRelatedi ( j :a, c)) must really be the same action as the one
which is the object of the earlier action-based emotion (e.g., j :a in PrideTi ( j :a)).
3.4 Derived emotion types
In this section we will provide semiformal descriptions of the eliciting conditions of
the bottom layer (of Fig. 1) of emotion types.
3.4.1 Prospect-based emotion types
Whereas ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ concern unconfirmed prospects of events, the OCC model
also distinguishes emotion types concerning confirmed and disconfirmed prospects,
namely ‘satisfaction’, ‘fears-confirmed’, ‘relief’, and ‘disappointment’. As explained
in Sect. 2.2, a confirmation or disconfirmation is regarded as an actual consequence
of an event, and therefore these emotion types are specializations of ‘joy’ and ‘dis-
tress’. However, they do depend on an earlier instance of ‘hope’ or ‘fear’, so the
formalizations below use the Past operator to capture this temporal link. These four
prospect-based emotion types can then be captured as follows:
SatisfactionTi (c, c′)
def= JoyTi (c) ∧ Past HopeTi (c′)
∧ Confirmsi (c, c′) (3.24)
Fears-confirmedTi (c, c
′) def= DistressTi (c) ∧ Past FearTi (c′)
∧ Confirmsi (c, c′) (3.25)
ReliefTi (c, c
′) def= JoyTi (c) ∧ Past FearTi (c′)
∧ Disconfirmsi (c, c′) (3.26)
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DisappointmentTi (c, c
′) def= DistressTi (c) ∧ Past HopeTi (c′)
∧ Disconfirmsi (c, c′) (3.27)
Confirmsi (c, c′) is read as “agent i considers consequence c as (partially) confirming
consequence c′”, and likewise for ‘disconfirm’. SatisfactionTi (c, c′) is then read as
“satisfaction about consequence c confirming consequence c′ is triggered for agent i ,”
and similarly for ‘fears-confirmed’, ‘relief’, and ‘disappointment’.
3.4.2 Fortunes-of-others emotion types
Finally, the four so-called fortunes-of-others emotion types are also specializations
of ‘joy’ and ‘distress’, as explained in Sect. 2.2. These emotion types concern conse-
quences of events presumed to be desirable or undesirable for someone else. In order
to capture presumptions, we introduce the Presume operator; Presumeiϕ is read as
“agent i presumes ϕ (to be true).” When grounding these semiformal specifications in
a BDI-based logic (as we will do later), the presume operator can easily be conflated
with belief. However, in order to remain independent of any underlying formalism, we
stick to OCC’s phrasing at this point and use ‘presume’ as the name for the operator.
The fortunes-of-others emotion types can then be captured as follows:
Happy-forTi (c, j) def= JoyTi (c) ∧ Presumei Des j (c) (3.28)
PityTi (c, j) def= DistressTi (c) ∧ Presumei Undes j (c) (3.29)
GloatingTi (c, j) def= JoyTi (c) ∧ Presumei Undes j (c) (3.30)
ResentmentTi (c, j) def= DistressTi (c) ∧ Presumei Des j (c) (3.31)
Happy-forTi (c, j) is read as “happy-for about consequence c (of an event) for agent j
is triggered for agent i ,” and similarly for ‘pity’, ‘gloating’, and ‘resentment’.
It may be interesting to note that it is not required for agent i to presume that agent
j is aware of the event in question as well. For example, suppose Alice has just learned
that she has won a magnificent cruise for two. She may feel very happy for her husband
(who she intends to take the cruise with) without him being aware of the prize yet. Of
course, Alice may feel inclined to tell her husband about the prize as soon as possible,
but it would be unreasonable to argue that she cannot feel happy for him before having
informed him.
3.5 Properties
To finish this section, we will show some properties of the (semiformal) specifications
presented in this section. So far we have ‘reduced’ the eliciting conditions of the emo-
tion types of the OCC model to formulas involving some standard logical connectives
and the following seventeen constructs:
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If the specifications presented in this section are accurate, then the eliciting conditions
of the emotion types of the OCC model are constructed around no more than sev-
enteen9 notions, represented by the seventeen constructs above. About half of these
constructs will be grounded in dynamic doxastic logic in the next section, whereas the
remaining constructs will be grounded in KARO (which is a BDI-based extension of
dynamic doxastic logic) in the section after that.
In the following properties, let T (where T stands for trigger) be a classical proposi-
tional entailment relation with formulas (3.1)–(3.31) as axioms. Furthermore,  T ϕ
denotes that ϕ is derivable assuming . Although formal proofs of propositions appear-
ing later in this paper are provided in Appendix A, the derivations of the propositions
below only involve manipulation of regular propositional connectives and therefore
we deem it as unnecessary to spell out these derivations.
The following properties read exactly as the type specifications for pleased, dis-
pleased, approving, disapproving, liking, and disliking given in Table 1.
T PleasedTi (c) ↔ PositiveTi (c) (3.32)
T DispleasedTi (c) ↔ NegativeTi (c) (3.33)
T ApprovingTi (i :a) ↔ PositiveTi (i :a) (3.34)
T DisapprovingTi (i :a) ↔ NegativeTi (i :a) (3.35)
T LikingTi (x) ↔ PositiveTi (x) (3.36)
T DislikingTi (x) ↔ NegativeTi (x) (3.37)
For example, Table 1 states that “pleased is being positive about a consequence (of
an event).” So if we put a consequence c into ‘positive’ (i.e., PositiveTi (c)), we should
get ‘pleased’. And indeed, formula (3.32) states that PositiveTi (c) is equivalent to
PleasedTi (c). The other properties follow the same pattern.
The following properties state that each pair of ‘siblings’ in the third layer of Fig. 1
completely subdivide their ‘parent’.
 T PleasedTi (c) ↔ (HopeTi (c) ∨ JoyTi (c)) (3.38)
 T DispleasedTi (c) ↔ (FearTi (c) ∨ DistressTi (c)) (3.39)
T ApprovingTi (i :a) ↔ (PrideTi ( j :a) ∨ AdmirationTi ( j :a)) (3.40)
9 Not counting propositional connectives.
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T DisapprovingTi (i :a) ↔ (ShameTi ( j :a) ∨ ReproachTi ( j :a)) (3.41)
where  = PerceiveConseqi (c) → (Actuali (c) ∨ Prospectivei (c)).
The following properties state that ‘siblings’ in the third layer of Fig. 1 exclude
each other.
 T ¬(HopeTi (c) ∧ JoyTi (c)) (3.42)
 T ¬(FearTi (c) ∧ DistressTi (c)) (3.43)
T ¬(PrideTi ( j :a) ∧ AdmirationTi ( j :a)) (3.44)
T ¬(ShameTi ( j :a) ∧ ReproachTi ( j :a)) (3.45)
where  = ¬(Actuali (c)∧ Prospectivei (c)). Together with the previous set of prop-
erties, this means that the differentiations directly below pleased/displeased, approv-
ing/disapproving, and liking/disliking are strict and complete. It should be noted that
these properties do not express that, e.g., an agent cannot experience fear and dis-
tress at the same time. The OCC model explicitly allows for mixed emotions, but the
question is whether this means simultaneous elicitation of mixed emotions or simul-
taneous experience of mixed emotions, which are two different things. We note that
the eliciting conditions, as described by OCC, of the pairs of emotion types above are
disjunct, when both are applied to one and the same action or consequence. Therefore
we conclude that OCC’s view about mixed emotions pertains only to the experience of
mixed emotions (which is not treated in this paper). So we still consider our approach,
including the four properties above, to be in line with the OCC model. For example,
the fact that FearTi (c) ∧ DistressTi (c) is a contradiction means that the perception of
one consequence c cannot trigger both fear and distress (because the triggering con-
ditions for the ‘fear’ and ‘distress’ emotion types exclude each other), but it is still
very possible that first fear for c is triggered and that shortly afterwards distress about
c is triggered (e.g., because the fear has been confirmed), and that after this moment
both the fear and the distress are experienced simultaneously for some time.10
The following properties state that ‘awareness’ of what one finds desirable and
undesirable leads to ‘joy’ being equivalent to “happy-for-self” and ‘distress’ being
equivalent to “self-pity.”
1 T JoyTi (c) ↔ Happy-forTi (c, i) (3.46)
2 T DistressTi (c) ↔ PityTi (c, i) (3.47)
where1= Desi (c)→Presumei Desi (c) and2 = Undesi (c)→Presumei Undesi (c).
The following properties state that proper ‘pride’ and ‘shame’ (in the sense that
the agent of the praiseworthy/blameworty action in question is exactly the self) are
equivalent to “self-approving” and “self-disapproving,” respectively.
10 A suitable definition of emotional experience allowing such mixed emotions can be found in Steunebrink
(2010).
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 T PrideTi (i :a) ↔ ApprovingTi (i :a) (3.48)
 T ShameTi (i :a) ↔ DisapprovingTi (i :a) (3.49)
where  = CogUniti (i). Note that these properties read exactly as the specifications
for ‘pride’ and ‘shame’ in Table 1, e.g., “pride is approving of one’s own action.”
The inheritance-based view of the eliciting conditions of emotions, as illustrated
in Fig. 1, raises the expectation that each depicted emotion type implies its parent.
Indeed, chains of implications such as the one below can be made for all emotion
types (except for the compound emotion types11). For example:
T GloatingTi (c, j) → JoyTi (c)
T JoyTi (c) → PleasedTi (c)
T PleasedTi (c) → PositiveTi (c)
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the OCC model does not require appraisal to
be consistent. Indeed, the following propositions are not derivable.
T ¬(Desi (c) ∧ Undesi (c)) (3.50)
T ¬(Praisewi ( j :a) ∧ Blamewi ( j :a)) (3.51)
T ¬(Appeali (x) ∧ Unappeali (x)) (3.52)
So it is not assumed that an agent’s goals, standards, and attitudes are consistent. This
implies that ‘mixed feelings’ are possible, i.e., formulas such as AdmirationTi ( j :a)∧
ReproachTi ( j : a) are satisfiable. In fact, for each pair of ‘opposing’ emotion types
(i.e., those sharing a box in Fig. 1), we have that their eliciting conditions do not
exclude each other. With slight abuse of notation, this can be expressed as follows.
T ¬
(
Emotion+Ti (X) ∧ Emotion−Ti (X)
)
(3.53)
where, e.g., Emotion+Ti (X) stands for HopeTi (c) and Emotion−
T
i (X) stands for
FearTi (c).
4 Grounding in dynamic doxastic logic
We will now introduce a formalism that will ground many of the constructs used in the
previous section to (semiformally) specify the eliciting conditions of the emotion types
of the OCC model. We have chosen to use dynamic doxastic logic (van Ditmarsch
et al. 2007; Segerberg 1995), because this is a well-understood formalism which read-
ily provides ways for reasoning about agents and their actions (because it is dynamic)
11 Each of the compound emotion types does inherit the eliciting conditions of its parents (e.g., ‘remorse’
inherits from ‘distress’ and ‘shame’), but they are preceded by a Past operator because the two inherited
sets of conditions do not have to be satisfied at the same time. Still, a chain of implications can be made if
one allows it to be “contaminated” by a Past operator.
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and beliefs (because it is doxastic). Furthermore, this dynamic perspective allows for
a straightforward representation of events and their consequences. Although dynamic
doxastic logic is not concerned with objects, we will introduce a reasonable way of
representing them as well.
We emphasize that it is perfectly possible to choose another formalism than we
did, as long as it supports reasoning about events and desirability, actions and praise-
worthiness, and objects and appealingness, as well as some temporal constructs for
the prospect-based emotions. We do not define the appraisal constructs (desirabil-
ity, praiseworthiness, appealingness) in pure dynamic doxastic logic in this section,
because it lacks ways of representing goals, standards, and attitudes. In Sect. 5, then,
we add BDI-based constructs and finish the grounding of the specification of eliciting
conditions of emotions. Also, we will not be concerned with formal semantics until
Sect. 5.
4.1 Basic operators
It is assumed there exists a set atm of atomic propositions, with typical element p.
Furthermore, we use the propositional connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔ with their usual
interpretation, as well as ⊥ for falsum and 	 for verum. We then typically use ϕ and
ψ to denote arbitrary formulas.
In dynamic doxastic logic there are of course two modal operators, namely for
belief and action. They are expressed and read as follows.
Biϕ: Agent i believes ϕ (to be true).
[i :α]ϕ: After the execution of action α by agent i , ϕ holds.
In the following we will also use converse actions (denoted as α−), which are
useful for expressing what was true before the execution of an action. For example,
[i : α−]ϕ expresses that, if it is the case that agent i has just performed action α,
then ϕ was true before that action. Because we will often need to express that some
agent has just performed some action, we define a convenient shorthand for this, as
follows:
Done(i :α) def= 〈i :α−〉	 (4.1)
Done(i :α) can thus be read as “agent i has just performed action α.” Note that angled
brackets are used to denote the dual of the action modality, as usual.
In dynamic logic, actions are used as an abstraction of time, which means that tem-
poral operators can be interpreted over actions. We will be using the following three
basic temporal and action-based operators:
Prev ϕ: In the previous state, ϕ was true. We say “the previous state,” because we
assume a linear history (and a branching future).
Past ϕ: Some time in the past (including the present), ϕ was/is true. Intuitively, this
comes down to ϕ ∨ Prev ϕ ∨ Prev Prev ϕ ∨ . . ., but since this is an infinite
formula, the past operator cannot be defined as an abbreviation.
123 [434]
Synthese (2012) 185:83–129 105
Fut ϕ: Some time in the future (including the present), ϕ may be true. Intuitively,
this can be seen as an existential quantification over agents and actions
(cf. formula (4.29) in Sect. 4.5).
Although the Past and Fut operators are—as usual—understood to include the
present, in the following we will mostly be using the future operator in situations that
exclude the present. For convenience, then, we define a strict version of the future
operator as follows.
Fut+ϕ def= ¬ϕ ∧ Fut ϕ (4.2)
Fut+ϕ is then read as “some time in the future, but not presently, ϕ may be true.”
In the following subsections, we will show how we define many of the constructs
used in Sect. 3 to model the emotion triggers. We will define these constructs as abbrevi-
ations (i.e. using def=) of the operators just introduced. Some constructs, however, will be
left undefined even here. These are the appraisal operators (i.e., Des, Undes, Praisew,
Blamew, Appeal, and Unappeal), confirmation operators (Confirms, Disconfirms),
and the cognitive unit operator (CogUnit). There are separate reasons for this, which
will be explained in Sect. 4.5.
The next subsections are structured as follows. First we will define the constructs
used for the event-based emotion types, then those for the action-based emotion types,
and then those for the object-based emotion types. Finally, several properties of the
presented definitions will be discussed in Sect. 4.5.
4.2 Events and their consequences
To start simple, we conflate presuming with believing:
Presumeiϕ
def= Biϕ (4.3)
The largest branch of the OCC model is concerned with valenced reactions to events;
however, events are said to always be appraised with respect to their consequences.
Now let us consider the distinction between consequences and events in more detail.
The usual view in dynamic logic is that the execution of an action is regarded as an
event. This makes sense because in dynamic logic, time passes only through the exe-
cution of actions, i.e., through a succession of events. Here we will follow this view
and only regard executions of actions as events. We then consider a consequence of
an event to be anything that was not true directly before the event, but is true directly











This figure illustrates that state w2 is the result of event i : α, i.e., the execution of
action α by agent i . Now any formula ϕ that is true in state w2 (i.e., w2 | ϕ) but
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was not true in the previous state called w1 (i.e., w1 | ¬ϕ) is considered to be a
consequence of the event i :α. It will be clear that an event can also have multiple or
no consequences.
For convenience, then, we introduce the following construct to capture conse-
quences of events:
New ϕ def= ϕ ∧ ¬Prev ϕ (4.4)
New ϕ reads as: ϕ was not true in the previous state but ϕ is true in the current state.
Note that Prev ψ expresses that ψ was true before the execution of the latest action,
i.e., before the latest event. Therefore, if New ϕ holds for some formula ϕ, then ϕ can
be regarded as a consequence of an event. Indeed, we have that w2 | New ϕ in the
illustration above.
Even though New ϕ expresses that ϕ is a consequence of an event, it may very well
be that no agent is aware of this consequence. There must be a change in an agent’s
beliefs before we can say that it perceives a consequence of an event (or anything in
general). Belief changes (updates) can easily be defined using the New operator, as
follows:
BelUpdi (ϕ)
def= New Biϕ (4.5)
BelUpdi (ϕ) reads as: the beliefs of agent i have just been updated with ϕ. A situation




































In the state before the event j :α, agent i does not believe ϕ, i.e., it envisages worlds
where ¬ϕ holds. In the state after the event j :α, agent i believes ϕ, i.e., in all worlds it
holds as possible, ϕ is true.12 In that state, then, BelUpdi (ϕ) is true. It should be noted
that BelUpdi (ϕ) says nothing about the event (e.g., the action j :α in the illustration
above) that actually ‘caused’ the belief update; all it expresses is that something hap-
pened and as a consequence, agent i believes ϕ to be true. In other words, from the
perspective of agent i , ϕ is a consequence of an event.
With respect to emotions concerning consequences of events, the OCC model distin-
guishes between the types ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ on the one hand, and ‘joy’ and ‘distress’ on
12 With the danger of getting ahead of ourselves, we use possible world semantics to illustrate these defi-
nitions. Indeed, we will ground the belief and action modalities using possible world semantics in Sect. 5.
The definitions given in the present section do not really depend on such semantics; these illustration, then,
only serve to get a feeling for what the defined constructs express.
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the other hand, based on whether the consequence in question is prospective or actual,
respectively. As noted in Sect. 2.2, the notion of “prospect” is intentionally ambiguous;
it is used to describe both future consequences and uncertain consequences. In Sect. 3
we used Prospectivei (ϕ) and Actuali (ϕ) to express that agent i considers ϕ to be a
prospective or actual consequence of an event, respectively. Using definitions similar
to BelUpd above, we define Prospective and Actual as follows:
Prospectivei (ϕ)
def= FutUpdi (ϕ) ∨ UncUpdi (ϕ) (4.6)
Actuali (ϕ)
def= BelUpdi (ϕ) (4.7)
where
FutUpdi (ϕ)
def= New Bi Fut+ϕ (4.8)
UncUpdi (ϕ)
def= New (¬Biϕ ∧ ¬Bi¬ϕ) (4.9)
We thus split the definition of Prospective into two cases in order to capture future
as well as uncertain prospects. The definition of Actual is the same as BelUpd (see
also the illustration above). The definition of FutUpd is also like BelUpd but then
with ϕ replaced by ¬ϕ ∧ Fut ϕ, i.e., agent i comes to believe that ϕ is not true but
that there exists a future in which ϕ will be true. The definition of UncUpd (“uncer-
tainty update”) also resembles BelUpd. If, in the illustration for BelUpd above, the
left ‘cloud’ would contain either only ϕ’s or only ¬ϕ’s, and the right ‘cloud’ would
contain a mixture of ϕ’s and ¬ϕ’s, then UncUpdi (ϕ) would be true in the bottom
right state. UncUpdi (ϕ) thus expresses that agent i has just become uncertain about
whether or not ϕ holds.
Prospectivei (ϕ) and Actuali (ϕ) are now defined such that they cover both cases
for perceiving consequences of events that are distinguished in the OCC model. This
means that PerceiveConseqi (ϕ), which we used to express that agent i perceives
consequence ϕ of an event, can be (trivially) defined as follows:
PerceiveConseqi (ϕ)
def= Prospectivei (ϕ) ∨ Actuali (ϕ) (4.10)
In effect, this definition specifies that perceiving a consequence of an event means
either perceiving a prospective consequence or an actual consequence. Indeed, these
are exactly the two cases distinguished in the OCC model. If one wishes to distinguish
more kinds of consequences of events, more disjuncts covering those cases could be
added.
4.3 Agents and their actions
It is assumed there exists a set agt of agent names with typical elements i and j , and
a set act of actions with typical element α. Furthermore, it is assumed each action is
unique, i.e., it can be performed only once. This can be seen as each performed action
being a unique instance of an action.
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In the previous section, we used PerceiveActioni ( j : α) to express that agent i
perceives that agent j has performed action α. Making use of the BelUpd construct
introduced above, we define PerceiveAction as follows:
PerceiveActioni ( j :α) def= BelUpdi (Past Done( j :α)) (4.11)
Note the use of the Past operator here. Because Done( j : α) only expresses that
agent j has just performed action α, we need the Past operator to express percep-
tions of actions that have been performed at some arbitrary time in the past. Thus
PerceiveActioni ( j : α) does not specify when exactly agent j performed action α,
just that agent i now believes it did and that i did not believe so before.
For the compound emotion types (gratification, remorse, gratitude, anger) it was
necessary to express a (presumed) relation between an action of an agent and a con-
sequence. For this we used PerceiveRelated, which we define here using BelUpd
again:
PerceiveRelatedi ( j :α, ϕ) def= BelUpdi (Related( j :α, ϕ)) (4.12)
Related(i :α, ϕ) def= Past (Done(i :α) ∧ New ϕ) (4.13)
For convenience we define a construct for relatedness separately (as it will be useful
later on). Related(i : α, ϕ) expresses that some time in the past, ϕ became true just
when agent i had performed action α. We do not suggest this establishes a causal
relationship between the action and the formula; indeed, the relation merely exists in
their co-occurrence. Note that this definition correctly expresses a relation because
of the assumption of uniqueness of actions. It should also be noted that the figure in
Sect. 4.2 illustrates this construct; in particular, w2 | Related(i : α, ϕ). With these
definitions, then, PerceiveRelatedi ( j :α, ϕ) expresses that agent i perceives action α
of agent j to be related to consequence ϕ if and only if agent i comes to believe that
ϕ became true exactly when action α was performed by agent j .
4.4 Objects and their aspects
It is assumed there exists a set obj of object names with typical element x . The OCC
model requires us to be able to view agents as objects, so it is required that agt ⊆ obj.
Furthermore, it is assumed that there exists an atomic proposition for each object that
identifies that object, i.e, {objectx | x ∈ obj} ⊆ atm. The notation objectx is used
to refer to the proposition identifying x as an object. For example, if x = mona_lisa
(∈ obj), then objectx may be the proposition mona_lisa_is_an_object (∈ atm). Using
this notation, the construct PerceiveObject used to capture the perception of objects
can simply be defined as follows:
PerceiveObjecti (x) def= BelUpdi (objectx ) (4.14)
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So perceiving an object is equated with a description of the object being added to the
agent’s beliefs.
4.5 Properties
We have so far ‘reduced’ the eliciting conditions of the emotion types of the OCC
model to formulas involving propositional connectives and operators from dynamic
doxastic logic (in particular, B, Prev, Past, and Fut). The following nine constructs
are still undefined:
Des Praisew Appeal Confirms CogUnit
Undes Blamew Unappeal Disconfirms
These constructs will be grounded in KARO (which extends dynamic doxastic logic)
in the next section. There are several reasons why they have not been defined in this
section. First, the six appraisal constructs (Des, Undes, Praisew, Blamew, Appeal,
Unappeal) require the notions of goals, standards, and attitudes, which are absent
in pure dynamic doxastic logic. Second, for the confirmation constructs (Confirms,
Disconfirms) we want to be more precise about what is being compared first. From def-
initions (3.24)–(3.27) it can be observed that the things being compared for (dis)confir-
mation are objects of event-based emotion types, which means that they must be related
to goals. Although it may be possible to define what it means for one consequence to
confirm or disconfirm another consequence just in propositional logic, we can be more
precise if we know what goals look like. Therefore, we postpone defining Confirms
and Disconfirms until we have formalized goals. Third, a proper formalization of the
notion of cognitive unit (as expressed by CogUnit) would require substantially more
(psychological) research, so we will leave this aspect mostly open in this paper.
To finish this section, we will show some properties of the formalization so far.
In the following properties, let DD (where DD stands for dynamic doxastic logic)
be a normal modal entailment relation with formulas (3.1)–(3.31) and (4.1)–(4.14) as
axioms. Then the following propositions are derivable.
DD ¬(FutUpdi (ϕ) ∧ UncUpdi (ϕ)) (4.15)
DD ¬(BelUpdi (ϕ) ∧ UncUpdi (ϕ)) (4.16)
 DD ¬(BelUpdi (ϕ) ∧ FutUpdi (ϕ)) (4.17)
 DD ¬(Actuali (ϕ) ∧ Prospectivei (ϕ)) (4.18)
 DD ¬(HopeTi (ϕ) ∧ JoyTi (ϕ)) (4.19)
 DD ¬(FearTi (ϕ) ∧ DistressTi (ϕ)) (4.20)
DD PleasedTi (c) ↔ (HopeTi (c) ∨ JoyTi (c)) (4.21)
DD DispleasedTi (c) ↔ (FearTi (c) ∨ DistressTi (c)) (4.22)
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where  = ¬(Biϕ∧Bi¬ϕ). The first three properties state that FutUpd, UncUpd, and
BelUpd are mutually exclusive. Because Prospective is defined in terms of FutUpd
and UncUpd, this immediately results in the fourth property. The fourth property
then leads to the fifth and sixth properties, because (4.18) was exactly the assumption
needed for properties (3.42) and (3.43). The seventh and eighth properties are the same
as properties (3.38) and (3.39), except without needing assumptions due to the way
PerceiveConseq (4.10) has been defined.
At this point it may be instructive to write out the definition of the eliciting
conditions of one emotion type and see our modular approach at work. Consider
HopeTi (c), which has been defined as PleasedTi (c)∧Prospectivei (c), which is equal to
(PerceiveConseqi (c) ∧ Desi (c)) ∧ Prospectivei (c), which is the same as
((Prospectivei (ϕ) ∨ Actuali (ϕ)) ∧ Desi (c)) ∧ Prospectivei (c). But this is equal to
simply Desi (c) ∧ Prospectivei (c). So although at first there may appear to be some
redundancy, our setup ensures that all inappropriate terms can be removed.
Below are several propositions showing how the dynamic and temporal operators
introduced in this section interact. Because we have not yet introduced formal seman-
tics, they cannot be called properties yet. The appendix provides formal proofs using
the semantics introduced in Sect. 5.
[i :α]Done(i :α) (4.23)
Done(i :α) → Prev 	 (4.24)
Prev 	 → (Prev ϕ ↔ ¬Prev ¬ϕ) (4.25)
¬Prev 	 ∧ ϕ → New ϕ (4.26)
Done(i :α) ∧ ϕ → Prev 〈i :α〉ϕ (4.27)
Prev [i :α]ϕ ∧ Done(i :α) → ϕ (4.28)
Fut ϕ ↔ ϕ ∨ 〈i1 :α1〉 · · · 〈in :αn〉ϕ (∃i1, . . . , in, ∃α1, . . . , αn) (4.29)
The first proposition reads rather tautologically: after the execution of action α by
agent i , i has done α. The second proposition states that, if an action has just been
done, there must exist a previous state. The third propositions states that Prev is its
own dual, provided that there exists a previous state. The fourth proposition states
that if no previous state exists, all formulas that are true now are also ‘new’. The
fifth proposition states that everything that is true now must previously have been a
possible result of the last performed action. As usual, 〈·〉 abbreviates ¬[·]¬. The sixth
proposition states that all necessary results of the last performed action must be true
now. Finally, the seventh proposition states that Fut is like an existential quantification
over agents and actions. Note that we slightly abuse notation here, because we do not
have quantification in our object language.
5 Grounding in a BDI-based logic
In this section we use KARO (Meyer et al. 1999; Meyer 2006) as a framework for
grounding the formalization of the emotions of the OCC model. The KARO framework
is a mixture of dynamic logic, epistemic/doxastic logic, and several additional (modal)
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operators for dealing with the motivational aspects of artificial agents. KARO was orig-
inally proposed as a specification logic for rational agents. It was thus designed to serve
a purpose similar to that of the logics of Cohen and Levesque (1990) and Rao and
Georgeff (1998). A crucial difference with these approaches is that KARO is primarily
based on dynamic logic (Harel et al. 2000) rather than temporal logic (Emerson 1990).
So one could view KARO as a kind of BDI (belief, desire, intention) logic based on
dynamic logic. Although the specification of informational and motivational attitudes
(such as knowledge and beliefs, and desires, goals, and commitments, respectively)
had been the main aim for devising KARO (van der Hoek et al. 1999; Meyer et al.
1999), the logic has also proven to be applicable for the description of agent behavior,
more in general. For example, in Meyer (2006) it has been used to specify four basic
emotion types. Here we present a modest extension of KARO, including operators
concerning past states, such that all emotion types of the OCC model can be specified
in this framework. We emphasize again that our modular approach makes it possible
to use other frameworks to ground our formalization as well.
5.1 Adding motivational constructs
In Sect. 4.3 we introduced the set act of actions. From act we derive the set plans,
consisting of sequential compositions of actions, with typical element π . plans is the
smallest set such that act ⊆ plans and if α ∈act and π ∈ plans, then (α;π)∈ plans.
The notation of the dynamic operator is extended to sequential compositions of
actions and its dual, as follows:
[i :(α;π)]ϕ def= [i :α][i :π ]ϕ (5.1)
〈i :π〉ϕ def= ¬[i :π ]¬ϕ (5.2)
In KARO, there are quite a few operators for expressing motivational attitudes of
agents (cf. van der Hoek et al. 1999; Meyer et al. 1999). Here we use three of them,
namely for (achievement) goals, abilities, and commitments:
Giϕ: Agent i has (achievement) goal ϕ. Here ϕ represents a state of affairs which
agent i wants to achieve. A goal ϕ is said to have been achieved when agent
i believes ϕ holds, i.e., when Biϕ is true.
Aiπ : Agent i has the ability to do π .
Comi (π): Agent i is committed to doing π .
Using these operators, several constructs are defined expressing (possible) motivations
of an agent:
PracPossi (π, ϕ)
def= Aiπ ∧ 〈i :π〉ϕ (5.3)
Cani (π, ϕ)
def= Bi PracPossi (π, ϕ) (5.4)
PossIntendi (π, ϕ)
def= Cani (π, ϕ) ∧ Bi (Giϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) (5.5)
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An agent has the practical possibility to perform an action/plan π to bring about ϕ iff
it has the ability to perform π and doing so may bring about ϕ. An agent can perform
π to bring about ϕ iff it believes it has the practical possibility to do so. An agent has
the possible intention to perform π to accomplish ϕ iff it can do so and it believes ϕ
is an unachieved goal.
For technical convenience, we do not require goals to be automatically dropped the
moment they are achieved (cf. Cohen and Levesque 1990), assuming this can only be
done using a special drop action (see also below formula (5.34)). The second part of
the definition of possible intention above guards against already achieved goals.
5.2 Semantics
KARO is a dynamic doxastic logic, so we will introduce belief models and action
models. Belief models are of the form M = 〈S, R, V 〉, where
S is a non-empty set of states (or ‘possible worlds’).
R = {Ri | i ∈ agt} is a set of accessibility relations on S, one for each agent name,
hence the notation Ri . So Ri ⊆ S × S for each Ri ∈ R.
V : S → 2atm is a valuation function, indicating which atomic propositions
hold per state.
As is common in doxastic logic, each belief–accessibility relation Ri is required to be
serial, transitive, and Euclidean, i.e., the modal logic KD45 is used for belief models.
The semantics of actions are defined over the Kripke models of belief, as actions may
change the mental states of agents. Action models are of the form M = 〈S,R, Aux,
Emo〉, where
S is a non-empty set of possible model–state pairs, where a model is of the form
M as above and a state is from S therein. That is, if (M, s) ∈ S and M = 〈S, R, V 〉
then it must be that s ∈ S.
R = {Ri :α | i ∈ agt, α ∈ act} is a set of accessibility relations on S. Each
transition is labeled with an agent name and an action, hence the notation Ri :α . So
Ri :α ⊆ S × S for each Ri :α ∈ R.
Aux = 〈Goals, Caps, Agd〉 is a structure of auxiliary functions, indicating per agent
and model–state pair which goals (Goals), capabilities (Caps), and commitments
(Agd) the agent has.
Emo = 〈Des, Undes, Praisew, Blamew, Appeal, Unappeal, CogUnit〉 is a struc-
ture of appraisal and judgment functions, indicating per agent and model–state pair
how that agent appraises consequences (Des, Undes), actions of agents (Praisew,
Blamew), and objects (Appeal, Unappeal), and how it judges cognitive units
(CogUnit).
In order to have a branching future and a single history, it is required that
⋃R is
injective. This ensures that any model–state pair can be reached from at most one other
model–state pair. Note however that this does not exclude parallel actions. For exam-
ple, if ((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ Ri :α and ((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ R j :β , then state (M′, s′) is
a result of the parallel execution of i :α and j :β in state (M, s). With respect to the
semantics of converse actions, let Ri :α− = (Ri :α)−, as usual.
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In the previous sections it was assumed that actions are unique. We are now in a
position to formalize this assumption as a constraint on R, as follows:
∀Ri :α ∈ R : ∀((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ Ri :α : Ri :α ∩ (S ′ × S ′) = ∅ (5.6)
where S ′ = {(M′′, s′′) | ((M′, s′), (M′′, s′′)) ∈ (⋃R)∗}.13 This constraint can be read
as follows. If state (M′, s′) is a result of action α by agent i (((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ Ri :α),
then no possible future state after (M′, s′) (collected in S ′) can be reachable by i doing
α again (Ri :α∩(S ′×S ′) = ∅). It may be interesting to note that this constraint implies
that
⋃R must be free of circles.
In line with previous work (Steunebrink et al. 2007, 2008), we define goal formulas
as non-empty, consistent conjunctions of literals. This way goals can easily be broken
up in subgoals; in particular, every non-empty ‘subconjunction’ of a goal formula is
considered to be a subgoal. For example, if p∧¬q ∧r is a goal, then p, ¬q, r , p∧¬q,
p ∧ r , ¬q ∧ r , and p ∧ ¬q ∧ r are subgoals. Goal formulas are drawn from the set
ccl which is defined as follows.
lit = atm ∪ {¬p | p ∈ atm} (5.7)
csl = { | ∅ ⊂  ⊆ lit,  PC ⊥} (5.8)
ccl = {∧ |  ∈ csl} (5.9)
where PC stands for Propositional Calculus (so each conjunction in ccl is consistent).
So lit is the set of literals, csl is the set of consistent sets of literals, and ccl is the
set of consistent conjunctions of literals.
The mappings of the three auxiliary functions are now as follows. Goals : agt ×
S → 2ccl is a function returning the set of goals an agent has per model–state pair;
Caps : agt × S → 2plans is a function that returns the set of actions that an agent is
capable of performing per model–state pair; and Agd : agt×S → 2plans is a function
that returns the set of actions that an agent is committed to (are on its ‘agenda’) per
model–state pair. Note that it is not assumed that goals are mutually consistent.
Finally, the mappings of the appraisal and judgment functions are as follows.
Des, Undes : agt ×S → 2L for desirability and undesirability (where L is the set of
all well-formed formulas); Praisew, Blamew : agt × S → 2agt×act for praisewor-
thiness and blameworthiness; Appeal, Unappeal : agt×S → 2obj for appealingness
and unappealingness; and CogUnit : agt × S → 2agt for cognitive unit.
5.3 Interpretation in KARO
We now have all ingredients necessary for the interpretation of formulas, presented
below. Formulas are interpreted in state s of model M, where (M, s) ∈ S. It should
be noted that the pair (M, s) is itself a state of model M, i.e., belief models (M) are
nested in action models (M). Strictly speaking, we should write (M, (M, s)) | . . .,
but we drop the M for notational convenience.
13 A∗ denotes the reflexive transitive closure of relation A.
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Let M = 〈S,R, Aux, Emo〉, (M, s) ∈ S, and M = 〈S, R, V 〉; formulas are then
interpreted as follows.
Basic connectives:
M, s | p iff p ∈ V (s) for p ∈ atm
M, s | ¬ϕ iff not M, s | ϕ
M, s | ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s | ϕ and M, s | ψ
Mental attitudes:
M, s | Biϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S : (s, s′) ∈ Ri implies M, s′ | ϕ
M, s | Giϕ iff ϕ ∈ Goals(i)(M, s)
M, s | Aiπ iff π ∈ Caps(i)(M, s)
M, s | Comi (π) iff π ∈ Agd(i)(M, s)
Dynamic and temporal operators:
M, s | 〈i :π〉ϕ iff ∃(M′, s′) ∈ S : M′, s′ | ϕ
and ((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ Ri :π
M, s | Fut ϕ iff ∃(M′, s′) ∈ S : M′, s′ | ϕ
and ((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ (⋃R)∗
M, s | Past ϕ iff ∃(M′, s′) ∈ S : M′, s′ | ϕ
and ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ (⋃R)∗
M, s | Prev ϕ iff ∃(M′, s′) ∈ S : M′, s′ | ϕ
and ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ (⋃R)
Appraisal and judgment operators:
M, s | Desi (ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ Des(i)(M, s)
M, s | Undesi (ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ Undes(i)(M, s)
M, s | Praisewi ( j :α) iff ( j, α) ∈ Praisew(i)(M, s)
M, s | Blamewi ( j :α) iff ( j, α) ∈ Blamew(i)(M, s)
M, s | Appeali (x) iff x ∈ Appeal(i)(M, s)
M, s | Unappeali (x) iff x ∈ Unappeal(i)(M, s)
M, s | CogUniti ( j) iff j ∈ CogUnit(i)(M, s)
For clarity of presentation the interpretation of 〈i :π〉ϕ is given. The future, past, and
previous operators are interpreted over all action-accessibility relations in R, which
is done by taking the union
⋃R. (⋃R)∗ is then a relation connecting model–state
pairs reachable in zero or more actions of agents. Notice that (M, s) and (M′, s′) are
reversed for the future and past operators. As usual, | ϕ is used to denote that ϕ is
valid, i.e., ϕ is satisfied in all possible model–state pairs.
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5.4 Appraisal operators
Until now we have deferred the problem of specifying appraisal to the functions Des,
Undes, Praisew, Blamew, Appeal, and Unappeal. In this section we have introduced
(achievement) goals, which will allow us to give meaning to these functions, but only to
a limited degree, because there are many other kinds of concerns, such as norms, inter-
ests, preservation, etc. Therefore, we will not define these appraisal functions; instead,
we will constrain them such that they capture appraisal for agents with achievement
goals only. The idea is that one can simply add more constraints to these appraisal
function if the framework is enriched with more kinds of concerns.
Before introducing these constraints on the appraisal functions, we define two helper
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(5.11)
where neg(p) = ¬p and neg(¬p) = p. Recall that we require achievement goals to
be consistent conjunctions of literals. The set sub will then be convenient for mak-
ing subgoals, and the set inv will be convenient for inverting entire (sub)goals. For
example, if p1 ∧ ¬p2 is a goal, then p1 and ¬p2 (and p1 ∧ ¬p2) are subgoals, and
¬p1 ∧ p2 is the inverted goal.
We will start now with the simplest case of desirability. Let Des be constrained such
that every subgoal is desirable, and let Undes be constrained such that every inverted
subgoal is undesirable:
Des(i)(M, s) ⊇ sub ◦ Goals(i)(M, s) (5.12)
Undes(i)(M, s) ⊇ inv ◦ sub ◦ Goals(i)(M, s) (5.13)
where ◦ is used to denote relation composition.14 These two constraints read just as
they are written: Des contains all subgoals, and Undes contains all inverted subgoals.
Let us illustrate the above constraint on Undes: if ψ = p ∧ ¬q ∧ r is a goal, then the
inverted subgoal ϕ = ¬p∧q is undesirable, because (¬p∧q ∧¬r, p∧¬q ∧r) ∈ inv
and (¬p ∧ q,¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬r) ∈ sub, so (¬p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q ∧ r) ∈ sub ◦ inv.
The OCC model considers praiseworthiness (and its negative counterpart blame-
worthiness) to be determined with respect to one’s standards. However, OCC note that
the praiseworthiness of an action may be evaluated with respect to the desirability
of the events caused by that action. Since we do not explicitly consider standards
here, we will constrain Praisew and Blamew using Des and Undes, respectively. Of
course, different or additional constraints may be studied if an explicit representation
of standards were added to the logical framework.
14 In the case where R is binary and Y in unary, the composition R ◦ Y is defined as: R ◦ Y = {x | ∃y :
(x, y) ∈ R, y ∈ Y }.
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We now constrain Praisew and Blamew as follows. An action of an agent is appraised
as praiseworthy or blameworthy when the appraising agent believes that the action is
related to a desirable or undesirable consequence, respectively.
Praisew(i)(M, s) ⊇
{( j, α) | ∃ϕ ∈ Des(i)(M, s) : M, s | Bi Related( j :α, ϕ)} (5.14)
Blamew(i)(M, s) ⊇
{( j, α) | ∃ϕ ∈ Undes(i)(M, s) : M, s | Bi Related( j :α, ϕ)} (5.15)
where Related is as defined in (4.13). We did not spell out the condition M, s |
Bi Related( j : α, ϕ) using the semantics because that would have made these con-
straints considerably more difficult to read without becoming more enlightening.
We emphasize that this constraint only makes an action praiseworthy to the agent
who desires its consequence(s); indeed, other agents may well disagree and find the
action in question blameworthy. Consider the following example from the OCC model
(Ortony et al. 1988, p. 135, italics in original) to illustrate this point: “[T]he issue is
not whether or not the blamed or praised person is in fact wholly or partially respon-
sible for the situation, and hence subject to praise or blame for his or her action.
For example, a subway vigilante who kills a teenager in the New York subway will
not experience shame unless he believes that what he did was blameworthy. In other
words, he has to believe that his action violated some standard or principle in which he
believes. If in fact he views his action as upholding some principle (regardless of the
opinions of others) he is more likely to feel pride than shame. On the other hand, we
as observers can quite consistently view his action as blameworthy by our standards,
(…).” In line with this view, the constraints above only specify praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness in terms of an agent’s own desires, allowing other agents with other
desires to disagree and assign praiseworthiness and blameworthiness differently.
According to the OCC model, appealingness and unappealingness are determined
with respect to one’s attitudes. Here we will not constrain the functions Appeal and
Unappeal with respect to objects that are not agents. Instead, we will only consider the
appealingness of agents, as follows. An agent is appealing to the appraising agent if
it has ever performed a praiseworthy action, and unappealing if it has ever performed
a blameworthy action:
Appeal(i)(M, s) ⊇ { j | ∃α : M, s | Past ApprovingTi ( j, α)} (5.16)
Unappeal(i)(M, s) ⊇ { j | ∃α : M, s | Past DisapprovingTi ( j, α)} (5.17)
Note that the definitions of ‘approving’ (3.8) and ‘disapproving’ (3.9) include the
perception of the praiseworthy or blameworthy action. Again, we did not spell out
these conditions using the semantics in order to keep the constraints concise and easy
to read. Although these constraints specify that the sets of appealing and unappealing
agents can only grow, it is important to keep in mind that this does not mean that every
agent will constantly feel liking and disliking towards more and more agents over
time. The eliciting conditions of liking and disliking also require the (mental) per-
ception of another agent or object, limiting the (re)triggering of liking and disliking
123 [446]
Synthese (2012) 185:83–129 117
emotions. Moreover, the actual experience of liking or disliking and their intensi-
ties depend on further factors such as the quantitative strengths of (un)appealingness
of and familiarity with the other agent or object (Ortony et al. 1988; Steunebrink
2010).
It should be emphasized that we have started out with just achievement goals as
the only concerns of agents. We have then defined (or rather, constrained) desirabil-
ity and undesirability in terms of achievement goals, then defined praiseworthiness
and blameworthiness in terms of desirability and undesirability, and then defined
appealingness and unappealingness in terms of praiseworthiness and blameworthi-
ness.
5.5 Cognitive unit
We do not constrain an agent’s judgment of when it considers itself to be in a cognitive
unit with another agent, except that we require each agent to at least be in a cognitive
unit with itself.15 This is expressed by the following constraint:
CogUnit(i)(M, s) ⊇ {i} (5.18)
This constraint ensures that ApprovingTi (i :α) is equivalent to PrideTi (i :α) and that
DisapprovingTi (i : α) is equivalent to ShameTi (i : α), as anticipated in Sect. 3 (cf.
formulas (3.48) and (3.49)).
5.6 Confirmation and disconfirmation
The only constructs yet undefined are Confirms and Disconfirms. Recall that
Confirmsi (ϕ, ψ) expresses that agent i considers consequence ϕ to confirm con-
sequence ψ , and likewise for disconfirmation. Now that we have restricted concerns
of agents to achievement goals only and defined achievement goals as conjunctions
of literals, representing (dis)confirmation has become quite straightforward.
For convenience, we first introduce some additional syntax. We will be using the
operator  as the syntactic counterpart of the set sub. The interpretation of  is thus
as follows:
M, s | ϕ  ψ iff (ϕ, ψ) ∈ sub
ϕ  ψ is then read as “ϕ is a (logical) part of ψ .” Furthermore, we add a syntactical
variant of inv. For a conjunction or literals ϕ, writing ϕ in the object language means
the ‘inverse’ of ϕ in the sense of inv. In other words, for all (ϕ, ψ) ∈ inv, ψ = ϕ.
Note that inv is symmetric, so that ϕ = ϕ, as expected.
15 Even this constraint may be too strong in general, because it may preclude a kind of ‘insanity’ where
one does not consider the self as the (cognitive) author of one’s own actions.
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Using these new constructs, we define Confirms and Disconfirms as follows:
Confirmsi (ϕ, ψ)
def= Bi (ϕ  ψ) (5.19)
Disconfirmsi (ϕ, ψ)
def= Bi (ϕ  ψ) (5.20)
These definitions express that a consequence ϕ confirms another consequence ψ when
ϕ is a (logical) part of ψ . It is incorrect to require that ϕ be (logically) stronger than ψ ,
because the idea of ‘confirms’ is that it must also account for partial confirmations. For
example, suppose Alice learns that a plane carrying four of her relatives has crashed;
she will then fear they have all perished but hope for survivors. When later she learns
that two of her relatives have survived the crash, this will both partially confirm her
fear and partially confirm her hope. To account for partial confirmations, then, we use
the construct ϕ  ψ .
It should noted that it is not impossible to define confirmation more generally. For
example, “ϕ (partially) confirms ψ” can also be expressed as “ψ |CL ϕ,” i.e., ψ
logically entails ϕ. But then we would need a construct for representing entailment
in the object language. In effect,  is a kind of entailment relation (ϕ  ψ implies
ψ |CL ϕ), but restricted to goal formulas (conjunctions of literals).
5.7 Properties
To finish this section, we will discuss some properties of the formalization in KARO of
the eliciting conditions of emotions of the OCC model. As usual, | ϕ expresses that
the formula ϕ is a validity, i.e., every state of every model satisfies ϕ. All definitions
presented in Sects. 3, 4, and 5 are assumed to be in effect. Proofs of the properties
below can be found in Appendix A.
The following properties show how the appraisal operators stem from just (achieve-
ment) goals and beliefs. Of course, concerns other than achievement goals can influ-
ence desirability, praiseworthiness, and appealingness, but we have restricted our study
of appraisal in this paper.
| Giϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ → Desi (ψ) ∧ Undesi (ψ) (5.21)
| Desi (ϕ) ∧ Bi Related( j :α, ϕ) → Praisewi ( j :α) (5.22)
| Undesi (ϕ) ∧ Bi Related( j :α, ϕ) → Blamewi ( j :α) (5.23)
| Past ApprovingTi ( j :α) → Appeali ( j) (5.24)
| Past DisapprovingTi ( j :α) → Unappeali ( j) (5.25)
Note that these properties correspond directly to the constraints specified in Sect. 5.4.
The notation ψ was explained in Sect. 5.6. We emphasize again that desirability and
undesirability, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and appealingness and unap-
pealingness are not mutually exclusive; see properties (3.50), (3.51), and (3.52) in Sect.
3.5. Furthermore, desirability and undesirability are not assumed to be individually
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consistent either. For example, Desi (ϕ) ∧ Desi (¬ϕ) and Undesi (ϕ) ∧ Undesi (¬ϕ)
are not contradictions.
The following properties are restatements of (3.42), (3.43), (3.48), and (3.49),
respectively.
| ¬(HopeTi (ϕ) ∧ JoyTi (ϕ)) (5.26)
| ¬(FearTi (ϕ) ∧ DistressTi (ϕ)) (5.27)
| PrideTi (i :a) ↔ ApprovingTi (i :a) (5.28)
| ShameTi (i :a) ↔ DisapprovingTi (i :a) (5.29)
Previously, additional assumptions were required to make these propositions deriv-
able. In our formalization in KARO, we have turned these assumptions into constraints,
making them truly properties.
In the following, we drop the agent subscripts (e.g., i and j) to ease notation; all
terms requiring one are assumed to have the same agent subscript. The four properties
below express the triggering conditions for the event-based (and self-based) emotion
types in BDI-like terms, i.e., in terms of beliefs and goals.
| Gϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ BelUpd(ψ) → JoyT(ψ) (5.30)
| Gϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ BelUpd(ψ) → DistressT(ψ) (5.31)
| Gϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ BelUpd(¬ψ ∧ Fut ψ) → HopeT(ψ) (5.32)
| Gϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ BelUpd(¬ψ ∧ Fut ψ) → FearT(ψ) (5.33)
The first property states that ‘joy’ is triggered with respect to ψ if ψ is a subgoal of the
agent and it has just updated its beliefs with ψ (i.e., subgoal ψ has just been achieved).
Analogously, the second property states that ‘distress’ is triggered with respect to an
inverted subgoal ψ if the subgoal ψ has just been undermined (i.e., part of ψ had
previously been achieved but the agent now believes the inverse ψ to be true). The
third and fourth properties have similar readings, save for being future-directed.
Of course it must be recognized that the current formalization also has its limita-
tions. The OCC model describes emotions with respect to events, actions, and objects,
and therefore the elicitation of emotions is naturally described in terms of the per-
ception of events, actions, and objects. However, this emphasis on perception fails
to incorporate changes in appraisal of goals, standards, and attitudes as triggers for
emotions. For example, the perception of a desired consequence can trigger joy, but a
new desire for a known consequence does not trigger joy in the current formalization.
Formally, we now have:
| New Bϕ ∧ Des(ϕ) → JoyT(ϕ)
| Bϕ ∧ New Des(ϕ) → JoyT(ϕ)
but the latter should intuitively be valid as well. Of course it is possible to define the
emotion triggers such that changes in appraisal are taken into account, but this will be
a topic of future work.
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The final properties that we will discuss relate intention with tracking of goal
achievements and undermining. Given several (reasonable) assumptions, the notion
of intention as used in KARO is related with a simultaneous elicitation of ‘pride’,
‘joy’, and ‘gratification’. Specifically, if an agent (possibly) intends to perform action
α to achieve goal ϕ, then after actually performing α, ‘pride’ about having done so
will be triggered, as well as ‘joy’ about the achievement, and ‘gratification’ about the
action leading to the achievement.
 | PossIntend(α, ϕ) →
[α](PrideT(α) ∧ JoyT(ϕ) ∧ GratificationT(α, ϕ)) (5.34)
where  is the following set of assumptions:
– B[α]ψ → [α]Bψ : α is accordant, i.e., the agent does not forget the results of α.
– 〈α〉ψ → [α]ψ : action α is deterministic.
– ¬(Done(α) ∧ Done(β)) for α = β: the agent cannot perform actions in parallel
to α.
– BGψ → Gψ : believed goals are true goals.
– Prev Gψ ∧ ¬Gψ → Done(drop(ψ)): only ‘drop’ actions can remove goals.
– ¬PossIntend(drop(ψ), ψ): the agent never intends to achieve a goal by dropping
it.
Interestingly, in contrast to ‘pure’ KARO, the current framework allows us to reason
about subgoals. This makes it possible to define a less strict version of PossIntend;
namely, one expressing that an agent can achieve a subgoal with some action or plan
(in contrast to a complete goal as required by PossIntend). Analogously, we can define
a construct expressing that an agent can undermine a subgoal with some action or plan.
These two constructs are defined below as PossAch and PossUnd, respectively (cf.
formula (5.5) in Sect. 5.1).
PossAchi (π,ψ, ϕ)
def= Cani (π,ψ) ∧ Bi (Giϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ ψ) (5.35)
PossUndi (π,ψ, ϕ)
def= Cani (π,ψ) ∧ Bi (Giϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ ψ) (5.36)
PossAchi (π,ψ, ϕ) is read as “agent i can possibly achieve subgoal ψ of goal ϕ with
plan π ,” and PossUndi (π,ψ, ϕ) is read as “agent i can possibly undermine subgoal ψ
of goal ϕ with plan π” (here ψ is thus an inverted subgoal of ϕ). It may be interesting
to note that PossAchi (π, ϕ, ϕ) implies PossIntendi (π, ϕ). Using PossAch we can
strengthen property (5.34), and using PossUnd we can add an analogous case for the
simultaneous elicitation of ‘shame’, ‘distress’, and ‘remorse’, as follows.
 | PossAch(α, ψ, ϕ) →
[α](PrideT(α) ∧ JoyT(ψ) ∧ GratificationT(α, ψ)) (5.37)
 | PossUnd(α, ψ, ϕ) →
[α](ShameT(α) ∧ DistressT(ψ) ∧ RemorseT(α, ψ)) (5.38)
where  is as in property (5.34).
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6 Related work
In this section we discuss several related attempts at adopting psychological models
of emotions for modeling artificial agents. We will discuss similarities and differences
with the presented approach.
6.1 Previous work
In previous work, Dastani and Meyer (2006) and Meyer (2006) proposed a functional
approach to describe the role of four basic emotions in practical reasoning. Accord-
ing to this functional approach, an agent is assumed to execute domain actions in
order to reach its goals. The effects of these domain actions cause and/or influence
the elicitation of emotions according to a human-inspired model. These emotions in
turn influence the deliberation operations of the agent, functioning as heuristics for
determining which domain actions have to be chosen next, which completes the circle.
The specification and implementation of emotions carried out by Dastani and Meyer
(2006) and Meyer (2006) follows Oatley and Jenkins’ (1996) model of emotions. In
contrast to our approach of capturing a broad and complete16 range of emotion types,
they consider only four emotions: happy, sad, angry, and fearful. Each emotion func-
tions as a label of an aspect of an agent’s cognitive state. The deliberation of an agent
then behaves in accordance with heuristics associated with these four emotions. Later
we have extended this approach by showing how interaction between hope and fear
can influence an agent’s deliberation (Steunebrink et al. 2007).
In other previous work, we have shown how emotional experience can be mod-
eled on top of a formalization of emotion triggers (Steunebrink 2010; Steunebrink
et al. 2008). We have then also shown how emotion regulation can be modeled on
top of a formalization of emotional experience (Steunebrink 2010; Steunebrink et al.
2009). This was done by introducing a notion of action tendency into the formaliza-
tion, which indicates which action(s) an agent tends to perform to mitigate negative
emotional experience. The present paper, however, is our first complete presentation
of our formalization of the eliciting conditions of the emotion types of the OCC model.
6.2 Another formalization of the OCC model
The construction of a complete formalization of the OCC model in agent logic has
previously been attempted by Adam et al. (2009).17 Our approach is similar to Adam’s
formalization in the sense that both use BDI-like logics (belief, desire, intention) to
formalize the emotions of the OCC model and that both approaches are based on
modal logic. Below we will briefly discuss major differences between the presented
formalization of the OCC model and the one by Adam.
16 That is, complete with respect to one psychological model of emotions, namely the OCC model.
17 In the following, we simply use “Adam” to refer to Adam et al. (2009).
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Just like us, Adam aims to be “as faithful as possible” to the OCC model. However,
Adam’s formalization of OCC’s emotion types has been tailored to their BDI-based
logical framework. In contrast, our formalization proceeds in three stages, where the
first stage captures the logical structure of the OCC model and only the last stage com-
mits to BDI. Furthermore, Adam’s logical framework incorporates several very strong
assumptions. For example, desires and ideals are assumed never to change and to be
free of contradictions (thus excluding many forms of ‘mixed feelings’); agents are
assumed to have complete introspection with respect to their desires; and all actions
are assumed to be deterministic, public, and accordant (i.e. no forgetting of effects).
By refraining from making such assumptions, we believe our formalization is able to
account for more situations in which emotions can arise (according to psychology).
Some of Adam’s definitions of emotions do not capture all aspects of what is sup-
posed to be formalized. For example, Adam’s formalization of hope and fear does not
account for future-directed prospects (only current uncertainty); ‘easy’ actions pre-
clude pride and shame; and partial (dis)confirmations cannot trigger satisfaction, fears-
confirmed, relief, or disappointment. Admittedly, the OCC model may be implicit or
ambiguous with respect to these and other aspects, but ideally, the process of formal-
ization should explicate such issues and offer clarifications.
There is some confusion in Adam’s formalization between emotion elicitation and
experience. Adam claims to formalize the eliciting conditions of emotions (as do
we), and the action-based emotions indeed appear to incorporate a trigger, namely
in the form of the perception of an action. However, Adam’s formalizations of the
event-based emotions do not incorporate any triggers. For example, joy is defined as
Joyiϕ
def= Beliϕ ∧ Desiϕ, but this expresses a ‘state of joy’ more than a trigger for
joy. (Also note that this definition does not force ϕ to represent a consequence of an
event.) Indeed, in the text Adam often identifies the satisfaction of an emotion formula
with feeling the emotion in question. When Adam defines the compound emotions
simply as conjunctions (e.g., Gratificationi (i :α, ϕ) def= Pridei (i :α, ϕ) ∧ Joyiϕ), it is
then unclear what Gratificationi (i :α, ϕ) actually represents because it mixes trigger-
ing (Pridei (i :α, ϕ)) and experience (Joyiϕ). In our approach, we have made a clear
distinction between emotion elicitation (treated in this paper) and experience (treated
in Steunebrink 2010) in order to avoid such confusion.
Finally, Adam’s formalization renders a number of properties of emotions that
we find too strong. For example, Adam proves that  ¬(Joyiϕ ∧ Distressiϕ) and
similarly for all pairs of opposing emotions applied to the same argument(s). Such
formulas are not valid in our formalization because we allow goals, standards, and
attitudes to be inconsistent. However, if their consistency would be adopted as a con-
straint, it would indeed be provable in our framework that opposing emotion trig-
gers contradict. Furthermore, Adam derives complete introspection of emotions (i.e.
 Emotioniϕ ↔ Beli Emotioniϕ and  ¬Emotioniϕ ↔ Beli¬Emotioniϕ). However,
if Emotioniϕ is supposed to be a formalization of the eliciting conditions of Emotion,
as Adam intends, then we find this unintuitive; one does not have to be aware of what
triggered an emotion. On the other hand, it is intuitive to suppose that one is aware of
what one does and does not feel, i.e., if Emotioniϕ were to represent the subjective
experience of Emotion. Again, because of confusion between elicitation and experi-
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ence in Adam’s formalization, it is difficult to judge the status of these introspection
properties.
6.3 A computational model of emotions
Gratch and Marsella (2004) have been working on a computational framework for
modeling emotions. The framework is claimed to be domain-independent and they
have implemented a process model, called EMA after the title of Lazarus (1994), for
social training applications. The appraisal process used in EMA is inspired by the OCC
model. As with our approach, the cognitive reasoning aspects of EMA are represented
using BDI concepts and the emphasis of appraisal is on goal attainment.
In contrast to our approach, Gratch and Marsella take a computational, quantitative
approach towards modeling appraisal. Specifically, the eliciting conditions of emo-
tions modeled in EMA are based on quantitative measures of, e.g., desirability and
likelihood. The calculation of these quantitative measures is facilitated by the usage
of subjective probabilities for beliefs and assignment of utilities to states. However,
precise triggering conditions for all emotions are not provided, so it is hard to judge
how strictly Gratch and Marsella follow psychological models of emotions and how
they deviate from or extend these. For example, in line with the OCC model, likelihood
of a desirable event is given as a precondition for hope. However, in EMA likelihood
of an event is equated with the believed probability of the event, such that likelihood
can also be used as a precondition for joy (in particular, if the likelihood of the event
equals one). But like Adam’s notion of expectation, such a definition of likelihood
models uncertainty about the current state but not prospects about future events.
Concerning the three main topics of modeling emotions discussed in the introduc-
tion (i.e. appraisal, experience, and regulation), Gratch and Marsella distinguish only
between appraisal and regulation. Probably owing to their computational, quantitative
approach, emotional experience appears to be merged with appraisal in EMA. Their
main focus is on modeling how emotions influence behavior, emphasizing modeling
of coping strategies for artificial agents. Behavioral effects of emotions have not been
treated in this paper, but a detailed analysis using the presented framework can be
found in Steunebrink (2010).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the OCC model (Ortony et al. 1988) of emotions and
proceeded with the formalization of the eliciting conditions of emotions according
to this psychological model. We have carried out this formalization in three stages.
First, we have captured OCC’s specifications of eliciting conditions in a semiformal
manner, thus without committing to a particular formalism and semantics. Second, we
have shown how OCC’s main notions of events, consequences, actions, agents, and
beliefs can be captured in dynamic doxastic logic. Third, we have represented OCC’s
main appraisal notions in the KARO framework, which is a BDI-based extension of
dynamic doxastic logic, thereby firmly grounding the preceding two stages. It should
be noted that the collection of emotion triggers that are satisfied in a certain state
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should not be regarded as a representation of an agent’s full emotional state. Rather,
it only represents which new emotions are triggered in that state, without specifying
whether these newly triggered emotions are (or will ever be) experienced.
The idea is that the emotion triggers function as input for an additional quantitative
model of emotions. Such a quantitative model should specify how triggered emotions
are experienced. Elsewhere (Steunebrink (2010) and Steunebrink et al. (2008)), we
have explained how emotional experience can be modeled on top of qualitative mod-
els of emotion triggers similar to the one presented in this paper. This was done by
introducing functions representing different parameters of emotional experience. By
setting thresholds for these parameters, different emotion words of the same emotion
type can be modeled. For example, ‘annoyed’, ‘livid’, and ‘outraged’ can each be
represented in the logic as different emotions of the type ‘anger’.
Finally, it should be specified what to do with experienced emotions. Previous work
on formalizing the behavioral effects of emotions either used a subset of the emotions
as described in psychological model of Oatley and Jenkins (Dastani and Meyer 2006;
Meyer 2006), or a subset of the OCC model (Steunebrink et al. 2007, 2009). We are
currently continuing in the line of Steunebrink et al. (2009) to formally specify emo-
tion-based action tendency for all emotion types presented in this paper. Unfortunately,
psychological literature on emotion regulation (i.e. the effect of elicited emotions on
behavior) does not provide classifications and schemes as clear as those on appraisal,
such as the OCC model. (For an overview of psychological research on the subject,
we refer the reader to Gross and Thompson (2007).) Thus to proceed with formalizing
in the direction of specifying the effects of emotions on the behavior and decision
making of agents will require more creativity on the part of logicians and computer
scientists. It should be noted that we have not included details on how to integrate
experience and regulation in the presented formalization of emotions in order to limit
the length of this paper. However, research in this direction can be found in other work
(Steunebrink 2010; Steunebrink et al. 2009, 2010).
Our future work on emotions is twofold. On the one hand, we are continuing our
work on refining the formalization of quantitative aspects of emotions and specifying
their effects on behavior and decision making. On the other hand, we are working
on an implementation of this formal model of emotions on top of the interpreter of
an agent programming language. This way we expect to validate the added value of
emotions on the decision making and believability of artificial agents.
Appendix A: Proofs of propositions
All proofs use the semantics given in Sect. 5.2.
Proposition (4.23) Take an arbitrary agent i and action α. Now for all ((M, s), (M′,
s′)) ∈ Ri :α we obviously have that ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ Ri :α− and M, s | 	, i.e.,
M′, s′ | 〈i : α−〉	, which is the same as M′, s′ | Done(i : α). Because (M′, s′)
was an arbitrary Ri :α-successor of (M, s), we have that M, s | [i : α]Done(i : α).
Because (M, s) was arbitrary, [i :α]Done(i :α) is valid. unionsq
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Proposition (4.24) Assume M, s | Done(i :α) for arbitrary (M, s), i , α. Then there
exists a model–state pair (M′, s′) such that ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ Ri :α . Because Ri :α ⊆⋃R, ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ (⋃R). Because M′, s′ | 	, we have that M, s | Prev 	.
Because (M, s) was arbitrary, Done(i :α) → Prev 	 is valid. unionsq
Proposition (4.25) Assume M, s | Prev 	 for arbitrary (M, s). This implies that
∃(M′, s′) : ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ (⋃R). But ⋃R is constrained to be injective, so
∃(M′, s′) : ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ (⋃R) and M′, s′ | ϕ is true if and only if
∀(M′, s′) : ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ (⋃R) implies M′, s′ | ϕ is true, i.e., M, s |
Prev ϕ ↔ ¬Prev ¬ϕ. Because (M, s) was arbitrary, Prev	→(Prev ϕ↔¬Prev ¬ϕ)
is valid. And because Prev ϕ implies Prev 	, this proposition can be rewritten as
Prev ϕ ↔ ¬Prev ¬ϕ ∧ Prev 	. unionsq
Proposition (4.26) If ¬Prev 	 holds, then for any ϕ, ¬Prev ϕ holds. New ϕ is defined
as ϕ ∧ ¬Prev ϕ, so ϕ ∧ ¬Prev 	 → New ϕ is valid. unionsq
Proposition (4.27) Assume M, s | Done(i :α) and M, s | ϕ for arbitrary (M, s), i ,
α, ϕ. Let (M′, s′) be the model–state pair such that ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈ Ri :α (there
can only be one such (M′, s′) because
⋃R is injective). Now M′, s′ | 〈i :α〉ϕ and
therefore M, s | Prev 〈i : α〉ϕ. Because (M, s) was arbitrary, Done(i : α) ∧ ϕ →
Prev 〈i :α〉ϕ is valid. unionsq
Proposition (4.28) Assume M, s | Prev [i : α]ϕ and M, s | Done(i : α) for arbi-
trary (M, s), i , α, ϕ. Let (M′, s′) be the model–state pair such that ((M′, s′), (M, s)) ∈
Ri :α (there can only be one such (M′, s′) because
⋃R is injective). Now M′, s′ |
[i : α]ϕ and therefore M, s | ϕ. Because (M, s) was arbitrary, we have that Prev
[i :α]ϕ ∧ Done(i :α) → ϕ is valid. unionsq
Proposition (4.29) The expression M, s | Fut ϕ is interpreted as ∃(M′, s′) ∈ S :
((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ (⋃R)∗ and M′, s′ | ϕ. This is the same as M, s | ϕ or
∃n ∈ N : ∃i0, . . . , in ∈ agt : ∃α0, . . . , αn ∈ act : ∃((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ Ri0 :α0 ◦
. . . ◦ Rin :αn : M′, s′ | ϕ, i.e., M, s | ϕ ∨ 〈i1 : α1〉 · · · 〈in : αn〉ϕ. So Fut ϕ ↔
ϕ ∨ ∃i0, . . . , in∃α0, . . . , αn(〈i1 :α1〉 · · · 〈in :αn〉ϕ) is valid (although strictly speaking
we do not have quantification in our object language). unionsq
Proposition (5.21)–(5.25) These propositions follow immediately from constraints
(5.12)–(5.17). unionsq
Proposition (5.26) and (5.27) These propositions follow immediately from proposi-
tions (4.19) and (4.20) and the fact that ¬(Biϕ ∧ Bi¬ϕ) follows from the seriality of
Ri . unionsq
Proposition (5.28) and (5.29) These propositions follow immediately from proposi-
tions (3.48) and (3.49) and constraint (5.18). unionsq
Proposition (5.30)–(5.33) JoyTi (ψ) is equivalent to Desi (ψ) ∧ Actuali (ψ) and
DistressTi (ψ) is equivalent to Undesi (ψ)∧Actuali (ψ). By Proposition (5.21), Giϕ∧
ψ  ϕ implies Desi (ψ) and Undesi (ψ). Because Actuali (ψ) is equivalent to
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BelUpdi (ψ), Giϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ BelUpdi (ψ) implies JoyTi (ψ) and Giϕ ∧ ψ 
ϕ ∧ BelUpdi (ψ) implies DistressTi (ψ). Propositions (5.32) and (5.33) follow analo-
gously, by noting that BelUpdi (Fut+ψ) is equivalent to FutUpdi (ψ), which implies
Prospectivei (ψ). unionsq
Proposition (5.34) Assume M, s | PossIntendi (α, ϕ) for arbitrary (M, s), i , α, ϕ.
Take an arbitrary model–state pair (M′, s′) such that ((M, s), (M′, s′)) ∈ Ri :α . To
prove: M′, s′ | PrideTi (i : α) ∧ JoyTi (ϕ) ∧ GratificationTi (i : α, ϕ), i.e., M′, s′ |
PerceiveActioni (i : α) ∧ Praisewi (i : α) ∧ CogUniti (i) ∧ PerceiveConseqi (ϕ) ∧
Actuali (ϕ)∧Desi (ϕ)∧Past PrideTi (i :α)∧Past JoyTi (ϕ)∧PerceiveRelatedi (i :α, ϕ).
We can immediately cross out several of the conjuncts: CogUniti (i) follows directly
from constraint (5.18); by definition (4.10), PerceiveConseqi (ϕ) follows from Actuali
(ϕ); and Past PrideTi (i :α) and Past JoyTi (ϕ) will follow automatically because ψ →
Past ψ is a validity. Writing out definitions, we have to prove M′, s′ | New Bi Past
Done(i : α) ∧ New Biϕ ∧ New Bi Related(i : α, ϕ) ∧ Desi (ϕ) ∧ Praisewi (i : α). If
M, s | ¬ψ and M′, s′ | ψ , then M′, s′ | New ψ . So for state (M, s) we have to
show:
(i) M, s | ¬Bi Past Done(i :α)
(ii) M, s | ¬Biϕ
(iii) M, s | ¬Bi Related(i :α, ϕ)
and for state (M′, s′) we have to show:
(a) M′, s′ | Bi Past Done(i :α)
(b) M′, s′ | Biϕ
(c) M′, s′ | Bi Related(i :α, ϕ)
(d) M′, s′ | Desi (ϕ)
(e) M′, s′ | Praisewi (i :α)
By Proposition (5.22), (e) is implied by (d) and (c). Because ψ → Past ψ is valid, so
is Biψ → Bi Past ψ , which means that it suffices to show for (M′, s′) that:
(A) M′, s′ | Bi Done(i :α)
(B) M′, s′ | Biϕ
(C) M′, s′ | Bi¬Prev ϕ
(D) M′, s′ | Desi (ϕ)
From Proposition (4.23), we have that [i : α]Done(i : α) is valid. Then by necessi-
tation Bi [i : α]Done(i : α) is also valid, and by the assumption that Bi [i : α]ψ →
[i : α]Biψ , [i : α]Bi Done(i : α) is also valid. But if M, s | [i : α]Bi Done(i : α),
then M′, s′ | Bi Done(i : α), which proves (A). M, s | PossIntendi (α, ϕ) implies
M, s | Bi 〈i : α〉ϕ, which implies M, s | Bi [i : α]ϕ (because α was assumed to
be deterministic), which implies M, s | [i : α]Biϕ (because α was assumed to
be accordant). But then M′, s′ | Biϕ, which proves (B). It is easy to verify that
¬ϕ → [i : α]¬Prev ϕ is a validity; then Bi¬ϕ → Bi [i : α]¬Prev ϕ is also valid.
Because PossIntendi (α, ϕ) implies Bi¬ϕ, M, s | Bi [i :α]¬Prev ϕ. But then M, s |
[i : α]Bi¬Prev ϕ and M′, s′ | Bi¬Prev ϕ, which proves (C). PossIntendi (α, ϕ)
implies Bi Giϕ, which implies Giϕ (because it was assumed that Bi Giϕ → Giϕ).
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So because M, s | Giϕ, M′, s′ | Prev Giϕ. Furthermore, because is was assumed
that ¬PossIntendi (drop(ϕ), ϕ) is valid, α = drop(ϕ). It was assumed that ¬(Done
(i : α) ∧ Done(i : drop(ϕ))), so the fact that M′, s′ | Done
(i :α) implies M′, s′ | ¬Done(i :drop(ϕ)). But it was also assumed that Prev Giϕ∧
¬Giϕ → Done(i : drop(ϕ)), so it must be that M′, s′ | Giϕ, which implies
M′, s′ | Desi (ϕ), which proves (D). It is easy to verify that the requirement of
unique actions (see constraint (5.6)) validates Past Done(i : α) → [i : α]⊥, i.e.,
〈i :α〉	 → ¬Past Done(i :α). Then Bi 〈i :α〉	 → Bi¬Past Done(i :α) is also valid.
The antecedent is implied by PossIntendi (α, ϕ), so M, s | Bi¬Past Done(i :α). But
by seriality of Ri , M, s | ¬Bi Past Done(i :α), which proves (i). PossIntendi (α, ϕ)
implies Bi¬ϕ, so by seriality of Ri , M, s | ¬Biϕ, which proves (ii). It is easy
to verify that Past (Done(i : α) ∧ New ϕ) → Past Done(i : α) is a validity. But
then ¬Bi Past Done(i : α) → ¬Bi Past (Done(i : α) ∧ New ϕ) is also a validity.
So (i) implies (iii), which proves (iii). We can now conclude that indeed M′, s′ |
PrideTi (i :α) ∧ JoyTi (ϕ) ∧ GratificationTi (i :α, ϕ). Because (M′, s′) and (M, s) were
arbitrary, PossIntendi (α, ϕ) → [i :α](PrideTi (i :α) ∧ JoyTi (ϕ) ∧ GratificationTi (i :
α, ϕ)) is valid. unionsq
Proposition (5.37) and (5.38) The proofs of these propositions are largely the same
as the proof of Proposition (5.34) above. For example, assuming PossAchi (α, ψ, ϕ)
or PossUndi (α, ψ, ϕ) still implies point (ii), because we then have that M, s | Biψ ,
that ψ → ¬ψ is valid, that Ri is serial, and thus that M, s | ¬Biψ . To prove
Proposition (5.38), points (d) and (e) become M′, s′ | Undesi (ψ) and M′, s′ |
Blamewi (i : α), respectively. PossUndi (α, ψ, ϕ) implies Giϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ, which by
Proposition (3.50) implies Undesi (ψ) = Undesi (ψ) and then by Proposition (5.23)
implies Blamewi (i :α). unionsq
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